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AMERICAN HEGEMO
AND THE Fo
AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION

IGN

Robert .... owlest
This Article uses insights from international relations theory
to challenge the received wisdom that U.S. courts are incompetent to decide
.foreign affairs issues. Since September 11, 2001, in particular, proponents
of broad executive power have argued that the Judiciary lacks the
Executive's expertise, speed, flexibility, uniformity, and political savvy
necessary in foreign affairs. For these reasons, legal doctrine has long
called for especially strong foreign affairs deference to the Executive.
This Article argues that special deference is grounded in an outmoded
version of the popular theory of international relations known as realism.
Realism views the world as anarchic, nations as opaque to the outside
world, and geopolitics as though a few great powers manage the
international system through realpolitik and the balance of power. When
incorporated into constitutional.foreign affairs law, these realist tenets lead
to a model that prioritizes executive branch competences over_judicial ones,
but offers little guidance on how to weigh _foreign affairs effectiveness
against other constitutional values such as liberty and accountability.
The Author proposes a new, uhegemonic" model of desired institutional
competences in foreign affairs law that takes account of the transformed
post-Cold War world. America dominates the globe militarily, has a
political system accessible to outsiders, provides public goods for the
world, and plays a major role in defining enforceable international law.
This American-led order will persist.for some time despite threats posed by
terrorism and the rise of powers such as China and Russia. Under the
hegemonic model, courts serve America 's .foreign affairs interests by
maintaining stable interpretation of the law and bestowing legitimacy on
acts of the political branches. Special deference is now unwarranted. This
Article concludes by explaining why Bo1Jmediene v. Bush and other recent
enemy combatant cases are consistent with the hegemonic model.
ABSTRACT:
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INTRODUCTION
'

How should the balance of power in the world affect the separation of
powers under the U.S. Constitution? The conventional approaches to this
question rely on an outmoded view of geopolitics. This Article offers a new
model for assessing the courts' appropriate role in foreign affairs.
American courts treat foreign affairs issues as unique and requiring very
1
strong, sometimes absolute, deference to the Executive. These "special
deference" doctrines are a swamp of under-justification and inconsistent
2
application. But when courts and scholars do seek to justify special
deference in foreign affairs, they usually resort to received wisdom about
superior executive branch competence attributes such as speed, flexibility,
3
secrecy, and uniformity contrasted with judicial incompetence. In the
1. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 22 (2d ed.
1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 663 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley. Chevron] (surveying the deference
doctrines). The courts give executive branch interpretations of treaties "great weight" See
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187, 194 ( 1961)). Scholars have concluded that in practice this translates into a very high level
of deference. See David Bedennan, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439, 1468-69 (1999) (''When it comes to treaty construction,
courts are likely to continue masking an almost abdicationist stance in judicial review as merely
gracious deference to executive branch interpretation.''); Scott Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty
Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 777, 789 (2008) (describing contemporary treaty interpretation
as involving ·'near-total deference''). But see Martin S. Flaherty, Globalization and Executive
Power (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-20, on file with author) [hereinafter Flaherty,
Globalization] (concluding that courts invoke "great weight'; deference but reach the same
conclusions as they would using other tools of statutory interpretation). Courts also abstain far
more often from deciding foreign relations cases under the political question doctrine. See
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 19-20 (1992); PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES,_JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 444 (4th ed. 1998) (''Though successful

resort to the political question doctrine in purely domestic disputes is rare, the doctrine appears
to have greater vitality in foreign affairs."); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness ofForeign Affairs, 89
IOWA L. REv. 941, 943 (2004) (concluding that "'reports of the doctrine's demise in foreign
affairs are greatly exaggerated").
2.
See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663 ("In most of its deference decisions, the
Supreme Court has simply assumed, or has asserted in a conclusory fashion, that foreign affairs
should in fact make a difference."); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The
Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1723, 1733 (2007)
("There is no question that a deference doctrine of some kind currently exists with respect to
executive-branch treaty interpretations. But the precise nature of that doctrine, its triggering
conditions, and the obligations it imposes on judges are far from clear."); Nzelibe, supra note 1,
at 943 (concluding that the judicial application of the political question doctrine in foreign
affairs is ••replete with so many inconsistencies that its basic contours remain ill-defined and
incoherent").
3.
See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Dep't ofthe Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 347 (7th
Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (explaining that the rationale for labeling certain issues as not amenable
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years since 9/11, in particular, these pragmatic arguments have been the
4
weapon of choice for defenders of special deference. The courts are,
5
apparently, bringing a knife to a gunfight.
Why do foreign affairs demand that the executive branch enjoy vast
discretion? The courts' view of their own competence has been shaped by
America's role in the world. There is a deep, if usually unarticulated,
connection between the assumed need for special deference and a popular
theory of international relations known as realism. Realism depicts an
anarchic international realm, populated only by nation-states, and
dominated by roughly co-equal great powers carefully balancing one
6
another. Executive competences are required to handle this dangerous and
7
unstable external environment.
This classic realist model of comparative institutional competence
seemed appropriate when America was one of several, or even two, great
powers. But even then, importing international relations ("IR") realism into
constitutional foreign affairs doctrine was a recipe for chaos. Realpolitik
8
teaches that the state must do whatever is necessary to protect itself. But
how can courts successfully balance this overriding principle against other
constitutional values such as the protection of liberty?
9
Moreover, the post-Cold War world has provoked a crisis in realism.
The United States is a global hegemon. It is unrivaled in its ability to deploy
force throughout the globe, and it provides "public goods" for the worldsuch as the protection of sea lanes in exchange for broad acceptance of
to judicial resolution is "based on the extreme sensitivity of the conduct of foreign affairs,
judicial ignorance of those affairs, and the long tradition of regarding their conduct as an
executive prerogative because it depends on speed, secrecy, freedom from the constraint of
rules and the unjudicial mindset that goes by the name Realpoliti/C'); Julian Ku & John Yoo,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive
Branch, 23 CONST. COMM. 179, 200-01 (2006) [hereinafter Ku & Yoo, Hamdan]; .Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1202
(2007).
4.
See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 200-01; Posner & Sunstein, supra note
3, at 1202-07.
5. See, e.g., INDIANA JONES AND THE KINGDOM OF THE CRYSTAL SKULL (Lucasfilm 2008)
(Indiana Jones: "I think you just brought a knife to a gunfight"). Indy is referencing a scene
from the first installment in the series, RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount 1982), in which
he used his gun to effortlessly dispatch a tough-looking goon impressively wielding a sword.
6.
See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American
Unipolar Age, 30 REV. OF INT'L STUD. 609, 612 (2004) [hereinafter Ikenberry, Liberalism].
7.
See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 977-78 (arguing from a realist perspective that the
anarchic nature of the international system requires special deference because the Executive
Branch is more competent than the courts to conduct foreign policy in this environment).
8.
For a discussion of realism and realpolitik, see infra Part II. A.
Campbell Craig, American Realism Versus American Imperialism, 51 WORLD POL.
9.
143, 144 (2004).
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10

U.S. leadership. Although realism predicts counter-balancing, no great
power or coalition has yet emerged to challenge America's predominance.
And despite a new round of predictions about American decline, the U.S. is
still projected to have by far the largest economy and the largest military for
11
decades. Political scientists have struggled to define this American-led
system, but courts and scholars of constitutional law have largely ignored
12
it. Instead, most debates about special deference have simply accepted
outmoded classic realist assumptions that became conventional wisdom in
the 1930s and 40s.
This Article offers a new model for assessing appropriate judicial
deference in foreign affairs that takes account of American-led order. By
maintaining consistent interpretation of U.S. and international law over time
and providing virtual representation for other nations and non-citizens, U.S.
courts bestow legitimacy on the acts of the political branches, provide
public goods for the world, and increase America's soft power all of
which assist in maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the American-led
hegemonic order.
This "hegemonic" model substantially eliminates the problematic
deference gap between foreign and domestic cases and enables courts to
appropriately balance foreign affairs needs against other separation-ofpowers goals by "domesticating" foreign affairs deference. The hegemonic
model also has explanatory and predictive value. In four recent cases
addressing habeas claims by alleged enemy combatants, the Supreme Court
3
rejected special deference! It refused to defer to the executive branch
10.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE
WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7-9, 31-139 (2006) (describing

numerous international public goods provided exclusively or primarily by the United States);
Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 609 ("The United States is not just a superpower
pursuing its interests; it is a producer of world order.").
11. See infra notes 326-334 and accompanying text.
12. See Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law,
CHI.
J.
INT'L
L.
(forthcoming
2009),
available
at
http://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 13 31162 (arguing that the breadth of
executive authority in foreign affairs should be considered through the lens of internal and
external constraints, and that the hegemonic system places fewer constraints on the U.S.
executive than in the past). Two scholars have drawn on a competing theory of international
relations, liberalism, to argue that globalization and the tendency of democracies to fonn close
ties may eliminate the justifications for special deference, at least in some circumstances. See
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1980, 2000
(1993) [hereinafter Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs]; Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the
(Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO Sr. L.J. 649, 652 (2002); see also infra notes 99-101
and accompanying text.
13. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (holding that Congress's
attempt to eliminate habeas corpus for accused non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantanamo
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interpretations of foreign affairs statutes and international law, and even
asserted military exigencies. The hegemonic model justifies this recent
rejection of special deference and explains why it could augur increased
judicial involvement in foreign affairs.
The interpretive scope here is limited. The hegemonic model is
functional but concerns overall governmental effectiveness in foreign
affairs, not the appropriate allocation of power with respect to any particular
policy. Nor do I analyze the appropriate allocation of foreign affairs powers
between the President and Congress, although the hegemonic model has
many implications for this relationship as well. Finally, I do not address
formalist - e.g., originalist arguments for or against special deference. The
hegemonic model provides insights that should be considered in
14
conjunction with the teachings of text, structure, and history.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, a background section, I
explain functionalism's centrality to debates about the separation of powers
in foreign affairs. I then describe the major special deference doctrines. I
conclude by briefly recounting the Supreme Court's refusal to apply special
deference in the enemy combatant cases.
Part II explains the origins of the functional justifications for special
deference. It limns the major tenets of international relations realism as it
had been traditionally understood prior to the post-Cold War era. Realists
15
describe the international realm as inherently de-centralized and unstable.
Nation-states, rather than individuals or institutions, are the only viable
units. States are identical in terms of their function like "billiard balls
16
colliding"
and the only salient difference among them is their relative
17
power. Great powers determine the structure of the system, and
18
enforceable international law merely reflects their interests. A lay version
Bay was unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006) (declaring unlawful
the military commissions established to try certain enemy combatants for war crimes); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that alien detainees at Guantanamo had a statutory
right to invoke habeas jurisdiction); Hamdi v. Bush, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that
citizen-detainees possessed the right to challenge their detention using habeas).
14. I have used originalist approaches elsewhere. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of
Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States· Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REv.
343, 343 (2003) (examining the original understanding of the Treaty and Admissions Clauses
and concluding that the Louisiana Treaty was unconstitutional).
15. Robert Keohane, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics, in NEOREALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 14-15 (1986) [hereinafter Keohane, Neorealism].
16. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate,
101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 256 (2007).
17. Keohane, Neorealism, supra note 15, at 15.
18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World ofLiberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 503, 507 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International].
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of realism became incorporated into constitutional foreign relations law
19
This
largely through the landmark 1936 decision~ Curtiss-Wright.
completed the transformation to an executive-centered understanding of the
foreign affairs Constitution driven by America's acquisition of an empire
and rise to great power status.
Part III comprehensively maps the functional justifications to
corresponding realist tenets, and explains how these realist assumptions
create more problems than they solve~ First, this classic realist model does
not accurately depict the actual functioning of the branches in foreign
affairs. For example, although foreign relations is said to require that the
United States "speak with one voice," Congress and the President often
conflict on foreign policy,. Second, as a descriptive matter, the realist model
encounters boundary problems because globalization will continue to blur
the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs issues. Third, as a
normative matter, the realist model, if accepted in full, would require total
deference:, it tells us very little about how best to balance foreign policy
needs against other constitutional values.
Part IV describes the current international order and introduces the
hegemonic model, which I construct using insights from three mainstream
20
,p reeminent-power theories: unipolarity, hegemony, and empire. The
hegemonic model assumes that (1) the hegemon plays a major role in
determining enforceable, international norms; (2) the system is durable and
stable; and that (3) the stability of the system depends not only on the
hegemon's military predominance, but also on its provision of "public
goods" for the system as a whole and the perceived legitimacy of the order.
The hegemonic model aligns the assessment of institutional competences
more closely with the positive reality of the international system. It brings
more coherenc-e to the courts' treatment of foreign affairs by largely
"domesticating'' it. And the hegemonic model reveals additional functional
justifications for greater judicial involvement in foreign affairs
controversies.
Part IV concludes 'b y using the hegemonic model to explain and justify
the results in the enemy combatant cases. In the Post-9/11 Era, the United
States faces serious threats from transnational terrorist groups such as alQaeda, rogue states, and the proliferation of WMDs, but these phenomena
will not themselves alter the hegemonic structure of the international
system. When they are properly viewed as problems of hegemonic

19.
20.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.~ 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
See Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 255.
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management rather than as some new form of realist balancing, they cannot,
in most situations, justify special deference.
I.

FUNCTIONALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE

The judicial treatment of foreign affairs comprises an a.morphous
constellation of special doctrines that require very strong deference to the
21
executive branch. Pragmatic, or functional, justifications lie at the heart of
this special deference. Courts and scholars have assessed the relative
institutional foreign affairs competences of the President, Congress, and the
Judiciary. The President almost always wins by virtue of superior
22
flexibility, speed, accountability, political savvy, and uniformity. But
largely unexamined are the reasons why foreign affairs require these prized
competences.
In this Part, I discuss functionalism's importance in foreign affairs
separation-of-powers analysis and describe the major special deference
doctrines. I then recount a recent and striking departure from special
deference: in four landmark cases considering habeas rights of accused
enemy combatants, the Supreme Court exercised more robust judicial
review akin to its treatment of domestic cases. The Court seems to have
ignored, even rejected, traditional assessments of institutional competence.
What justifies this refusal to defer?
A. The Prominence ofFunctionalism in Foreign Affairs

The uniqueness of foreign affairs stems in part from a void in the text
23
that has long bedeviled constitutional analysis in this area. Article II of the
Constitution specifically allocates only a handful of foreign affairs powers
24
to the President, but Article I fails to provide Congress with all, or even
25
most, of the remaining powers necessary to conduct foreign policy. This
See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663.
See infra Part III for an in-depth discussion of these competences.
23. See LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2
(1990) (describing as a Htwilight zone~' the legal ambiguity created by a Constitution that gives
scant attention to foreign affairs and whose framers could not have envisioned the importance
that foreign policy would assume in our governance).
24. The President's enumerated powers are to receive ambassadors, to act as Commander
in Chief of the military, and to share with the Senate the power to make treaties and
ambassadorial appointments. U.S. CaNST. art. II,§§ 2-3.
25. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 14-15 (concluding that "a host" ofpowers
"were clearly intended for, and have always been exercised by, the federal government, but
where does the Constitution say it shall be so?").
21.
22.
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void is puzzling given that one clear purpose of the Constitution was to
overcome the slow, fractured, and limp foreign policy power previously
26
vested in Congress by the Articles of Confederation.
With the text presenting this difficulty, opposing sides in the classic
twentieth cen
debates about the separation of powers in foreign affairs
turned to extra-textual sources for ammunition. The debate was engaged
most intensely on whether the President, Congress, or neither should have
27
primacy. In general, the nature of the textual problem influenced the
approaches to constitutional interpretation formalist or functionalisttaken by the defenders and critics of presidential primacy. Formalism and
functionalism are the two broad categories of methods for interpreting the
28
Constitution's allocation of powers among the branches. Formalist
approaches look to the Constitution's text, structure, and historical materials
29
thought to reveal the meaning of the text. Pure formalism is essentialistit seeks to understand whether a particular power is inherently executive,
30
judicial, or legislative. In contrast, functionalism examines whether a
31
given allocation of power serves particular purposes.
Because Congress has many more specifically-enumerated foreign
affairs powers than the President, a formalist would appear to be on stronger
32
ground arguing for congressional primacy. On the other hand, a
26. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, Ill YALE L.J. 231, 277 (200 1) (noting that, under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress "'enjoyed the executive power," but was criticized from the beginning as lacking the
"secrecy, dispatch, and consistency" required to effectively conduct foreign affairs).
27. !d. at 238.
28. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 & n.34,
1739-42 (1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Dangerous]; Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function
in the National Security Constitution, CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1159595.
29. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, ulfAngels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991)
(describing formalism as the view that "the constitutional validity of a particular branch action,
from the perspective of separation of powers, is to be determined not by resort to functional
balancing, but solely by the use of a definitional analysis"). There is, of course, no consensus on
the precise boundaries between formalism and functionalism. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 21, 21-22 (1998); Pearlstein, supra note 28.
30. Redish & Cisar, supra note 29, at 455.
31. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (describing functionalism as inquiring
whether "a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating the
functions of govemment," and concluding that "[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives or the hallmarks of democratic government"); Pearlstein, supra note 28.
32. This argument quickly encounters difficulties, however, because the powers provided
to Congress are also inadequate to conduct foreign policy. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
26, at 237.
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functionalist could argue that the general purposes of foreign affairs powers
would be frustrated by vesting them in a slow-moving and multi-member
legislative branch rather than a unitary executive capable of moving with
speed, vigor, and secrecy.
In any event, proponents of executive branch dominance have triumphed
in the courts and in practice, a victory driven largely by functional
33
considerations. In assessing the steady growth in presidential power in the
twentieth century, Louis Henkin observed that although ''the powers
explicitly vested in [the office] are few and appear modest ... the structure
of' the federal government, the facts of national life, the realities and
exigencies of international relations ... and the practices of diplomacy,
have afforded Presidents unique temptations and unique opportunities to
34
acquire unique and ever larger powers. '' Without resort to the procedure
specified in the Treaty Clause, for example, the President has entered into
numerous "sole-executive agreements" that were held to trump inconsistent
35
,state laws. On the academic side, H, Jefferson Powell, among others, has
made a strong case for presidential primacy, arguing that it best fits "the
goals and functions of the federal government in the area of ·foreign
36
affairs.
While functionalism was thought to favor presidential primacy,
formalism has been used by both sides in the debate. The huge growth in
presidential power at the expense of the other branches had, by the 1980s,
provoked a backlash in the academy. In the wake of the Vietnam War and
the Iran-Contra Affair~ which seemed to expos.e deep flaws in presidential
37
primacy, many scholars argued 'f or formalist limits on exe,c utive power.
33. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 238-39.
34. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 31. For a classic study of the growth of
presidential power and its implications, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY ( 1973 ) ..
35. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942) (holding that exchange of
letters by President Roosevelt resolving claims by Soviet government trumped inconsistent state
laws); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (similar).
36. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 548 (1999). Powell concludes that the
President~s power to make foreign policy derived from ''a complex mixture of textual arguments
. structural arguments ... [, and] on pragmatic considerations about the executive's superior
capacity for actually carrying out the tasks of foreign policy." ld. at 547-48.
37. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-10 (1993) (arguing that the
Declare War Clause vested the power to make war only in Congress, and that the President's
war powers were limited to "repel[ling] sudden attacks" and assuming tactical control, as
Commander in Chief, of war after it was declared by Congress); HAROLD ,HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-72
(1990) (arguing for essentialist limits on executive power); see also Pearlstein, supra note 28
(discussing scholars' approaches).
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But originalism' s rise to prominence made formalism available as a tool for
proponents of presidential primacy as well. Looking afresh at the text,
structure, and early practice, originalists have made innovative arguments
38
for broad executive power in foreign affairs. And yet, other scholars, using
similar formalist methods, have reached starkly different conclusions about
39
the original understanding of executive power. These sorts of originalist
stalemates have now become fairly common in constitutional foreign affairs
40
scholarship, indicating a need for functionalist reinforcement.
The terrible 9/11 attacks altered foreign affairs scholarship and
magnified the importance of functionalist arguments for expansive
41
executive power and limited judicial review. These arguments have
generally focused on threats from terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. Scholars such as Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and Bruce
Ackerman argue that these threats are unique in history, that formalist
understandings of the Constitution are inadequate to meet them, and that
they require the speed, secrecy, and unity of decision-making found only in
42
the executive branch. John Yoo, who had in the past made a
comprehensive case for special deference using both fortnalist and
functionalist methods, emphasized the importance of functional

38.

See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 253 (arguing that the "Vesting Clause" in

Article II provides the President with "residual" and non-specified foreign affairs powers).
39. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 548-51 (2004) (using text and history to challenge the
thesis that the Vesting Clause is a basis for broad executive foreign affairs power).
40. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 153, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Ku & Yoo,
Formalism]. Professors Ku and Yoo observe that, in the "'sharp" and "bitter" debate about
whether the Alien Tort Statute creates a cause of action, ~4ineither side has convinced the other"
using formalist and originalist methods. /d. at 154. Professors Ku and Yoo take ua different
approach," conducting a functionalist, "comparative institutional analysis of the role of the
courts in foreign affairs." /d. For an example of originalist interpretations reaching conflicting
conclusions, compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II,
99 MICH. L. REv. 98, 99-105 (2000) (challenging the "nationalist" view of the treaty power
articulated in Restatement (Third) as inconsistent with the original understanding) with David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1079-80 (2000) (supporting the
nationalist view of the treaty power as consistent with original understanding and historical
practice).
41. Pearlstein, supra note 28.
42. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT AITACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170-71 (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE: SECURITY . LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 205 (2007). John Yoo has made both forrnalist
and functionalist arguments for executive primacy. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation
and the False Sirens ofDelegation, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1305, 1305 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaty
Interpretation] (arguing for total deference to executive interpretations of treaties).
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43

considerations after 9/11. Similar functional justifications lie at the core of
Bush administration arguments against judicial review of executive policies
44
regarding the interrogation, detention, and trial of suspected terrorists.
In response to these functionalist arguments and the perceived excesses
of U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first cen ·. ,: many scholars .have
returned to fortnalism, arguing that the Constitution's inherent limitations
on government power are most valuable when they are being tested in
45
crises. But a few critics of broad executive power have sought to address
the post-9/11 functional arguments on their own terms by returning to the
Founders' purposes in cre.ating a government with a separation of powers:
(1) protecting individual rights; (2) keeping the government accountable to
46
the electorate; and (3) effectiveness. Deborah Pearlstein has identified two
47
species of effectiveness-: role effectiveness and raw effectiveness. Role
effectiveness means ensuring '~that the specialization and competence of the
branches are used together in a way necessary to run an effective
government,'' while "raw effectiveness" involves allocating power that
48
achieves a good outcome as a matter ofpolic.y.
Effectiveness cone-ems predominate in the post-9/11 arguments for
expansive executive power. Pearlstein points out that many of these
arguments are based on untested assumptions about the "raw effectiveness"
of certain executive competences in combating terrorism; using
organization theory, she makes the case for judicial review in terrorist
49
suspect detention schemes. Other critics of expansive executive power
have made compelling role-effectiveness arguments for judicial review,
emphasizing the separation-of-powers goals of protecting individual liberty

43. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186; Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40,
at 188.
44~ See Pearlstein, supra note 28.
45. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S~ Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
.Lowest .Ebb, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689 (2008); Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Stephen I.
Vladeck,_The Detention Power, 22 YALEL. & POL'YREV. 153 (2004).
46. Flaherty, Dangerous, supra note 28, at 1740, 1786 (identifying separation of powers
goals of"balance," "accountability," and governmental "energy"); Pearlstein, supra note 28; see
also Bruce Ackertnan, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REv. 633, 634 (2000)
(arguing, prior to 9/11, that the separation of powers goals were the protection of fundamental
rights, democracy, and professionalism).
47. Pearlstein, supra note 28.
48. /d.
49. Pearlstein observes that uthere is nothing inherent in the nature of functional analysis
that should point in one direction or another in resolving a separation-of-powers dispute, even in
the national security context." /d.
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and ensuring accountability. 5° However, these critics have not addressed the
1
broad theory of geopolitics underlying the deferentialist arguments. 5

B. Judicial Deference and Foreign Affairs
While the functional arguments were classically used to advocate
presidential primacy over Congress, they also have been used to tag the
courts as a distant third in foreign affairs competence. Louis Henkin
summed up courts' perceived incompetence: "Judge-made law, the courts
must recognize, can [only] serve foreign policy . . . grossly, and
spasmodically; their attempts to draw lines and make exceptions must be
bound in doctrine and justified in reasoned opinions, and they cannot
52
provide flexibility, completeness, and comprehensive coherence." The
courts largely shared this view of their own capacities, resulting in
exceptional deference in foreign affairs matters. This subpart describes the
major foreign affairs deference doctrines and how they .differ from domestic
doctrines.
1. Domestic Deference
Deference is a striking departure from the norm of judicial review. The
federal courts are "vested" under the Constitution with the "Judicial Power
of the United States,'' which encompasses the interpretation of statutes and
53
common law. When courts defer to the executive branch's interpretation
4
of the law, they cede some or all of this power. 5
Nonetheless, deference is common, even in non-foreign affairs cases.
Domestic deference to executive branch interpretation of statutes now
55
56
generally falls under two frameworks, Chevron and Skidmore. Chevron
50. See, e.g., Flaherty, Globalization, supra note 1.
51. I discuss the scholars who have addressed geopolitical theories in Part I. B.
52. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 140. I discuss and analyze the functional
arguments for courts' foreign affairs incompetence in Part III.
53. U.S. CaNST. art. Ill, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
54. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 780 ("At its core, deference is the ceding of one power in
favor of another.~'); see also Paul Hotwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1061, 1073 (2008) ("Deference, then, involves a decisionmaker ("D 1") setting aside its own
judgment and following the judgment of another decisionmaker ("02'') in circumstances in
which the deferring decisionmaker, Dl, might have reached a different decision.").
55. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,. 842-43
(1984).
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is the strong deference that applies when Congress delegates lawmaking
authority to an agency and intends that regulations "carry the force of
57
law." This intent is manifested if the regulations are the product of a full
58
and fair process that included public notice and comment. Under Chevron,
if Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue, the court
follows that interpretation; but if Congress did not address the issue and the
statute is silent or ambiguous, the court ac-c-epts the agency s interpretation
59
so long as it is "reasonable." Skidmore is the weaker deference that applies
if there is no congressional intent that the regulations carry the force of
60
law. Skidmore deference is fluid and encompasses factors such as "the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
6
expertness and ... the persuasiveness of the agency's position." J The
Skidmore factors play "little if any" role in Chevron's low-threshold
62
reasonableness inquiry.
T.hrough these domestic deference doctrines, the courts sought to
accommodate the rise of the administrative state and the complexity of
63
modern govemance. Functionalism lies at the heart of Chevron. Because
Congress almost never says whether it is delegating lawmaking authority,
some scholars describe the delegation theory as a "le:gal fiction'' or a
64
judicial background principle against whic.h Congress may legislate. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this difficulty in Chevron itself, and looked
to two functional, institutional competence justifications agency expertise
7

See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The courts apply other
deference doctrines in certain specific circumstances. For a comprehensive description of these
doctrines and a revisionist take on the leading role of Chevron, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. and
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference.· Supreme Court Treatment qf Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 109{}-91 (2008) (analyzing and
categorizing the Supreme Court's deference decisions since Chevron and concluding that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Court had employed a '"continuum of deference regimes''
in which Chevron played only ·'a modest role").
57. United 'States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
58. !d. at 226-27.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
60. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
61. ld.; see generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235 (2007) (describing the- history of Skidmore
deference, analyzing courts' application of the doctrine, and proposing a framework to clarify
it).
62. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 83J, 855
56.

'

'

(2001).

See-Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1220.
!d.; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions qf Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
63.
64.
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65

and political accountability, which the courts lack. Importantly, Chevron's
reasonableness inquiry does not require that the agency's interpretation be
consistent over time, so flexibility is often cited as a functional justification
66
for Chevron deference as well. In addition, Chevron has been justified as
promoting uniformity, centralizing interpretation in an agency rather than a
67
diffuse court system. However, these functional justifications for Chevron
assume that the agency has used full and fair process in rulemaking.
2. Foreign Affairs Deference
The courts generally utilize a different form of deference in foreign
68
affairs cases. These standards are vaguer and more sweeping than Chevron
or Skidmore.
One form of foreign affairs deference has been recently dubbed by two
69
scholars as Curtiss- Wright deference, for the controversial, but highly
influential, 1936 decision declaring the "very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
7
government in the field of international relations. " ° Curtiss- Wright
appeared to recognize independent executive branch lawmaking power in
71
foreign affairs derived from Article II. This obviates the need for a theory
of congressional delegation and calls for deference not only when the
statute is ambiguous, but when Congress has not "clearly trumped" the

65.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc . , 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984);
see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1193-94.
66. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 673; see also Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 742 ( 1996) ("[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency
position is not fatal
since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by
the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.").
67. Bradley, Chevron, supra note I, at 673; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its
Aftermath: Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretations ofStatutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv.
301, 310-13 (1988) .
68. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 673-74. But cf Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338,
1349 (lith Cir. 2000) (applying Chevron deference to Executive Branch interpretation of an
immigration statute and observing that "the authority of the executive branch to fill gaps is
especially great in the context of immigration policy").
69. See generally Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56.
70. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). As I discuss in
more detail in Part II.B, Curtiss-Wright offered a number of functional justifications for
expansive executive power and limited judicial review rooted in a realist view of international
relations.
71. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1099. For an originalist argument that Article II
does not create independent presidential lawmaking power, see Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
26, at 252-56.
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72

executive branch interpretation. When the Court invokes this standard, the
73
government almost always prevails.
But in most of these cases, the courts are deferring in another way as
well: they refuse to independently evaluate the government's asserted
74
foreign affairs interests diplomatic, security, or military. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, for instance, decided in the wake of the Iran Hostage
Crisis, the Court applied Curtiss- Wright deference, upholding a presidential
order suspending claims in U.S. courts against Iran in fulfillment of the
agreement releasing the hostages, despite lack of congressional
75
authorization. The Court deferred to the executive detennination that it
was "a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute
76
between our country and another."
In treaty interpretation, courts give the executive branch's views "great
77
weight. " The standard is very murky but is generally thought to be highly
deferential. David Bederman, in surveying twenty-three Supreme Court
treaty interpretation cases from 1953 to 1993, concluded that the Court
"plays out a dance in Which it reaches the interpretive merits of a treaty
78
case" but will "comply invariably with the executive branch"s wishes.''
Robert Chesney, after surveying the sixty-seven published opinions
involving treaty interpretation in all federal courts from 1984 to 2005,
concluded that "the executive viewpoint does prevail in most instances,"
even if lower courts are occasionally willing to reject the executive branch
79
at first. Martin Flaherty, however, views the treaty cases differently and
72. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1100-01; see also, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 530, 534 (1988) (ruling against judicial review of presidential revocation of
security clearances and declaring that, '~unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise,
courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military
and national security affairs").
73. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 56, at 1101 (concluding that the government has
prevailed in each of nine cases invoking the standard since Chevron).
74. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 661-62; Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind
Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 445-47 (2005)
(distinguishing between "legal deference" and "factual deference'' in national security cases).
75. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,658 (1981).
76. /d. at 688; see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (deferring to
President's determination that restricting Cuba's access to hard currency was in the interests of
the United States because the money could be used to support violence and terrorism).
77. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 336 (2006) ('"[W]hile courts interpret
treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."') (quoting Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961 )).
78. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1016 (1994).
79. Chesney, supra note 2, at 1754-55.
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argues that courts would have reached the same conclusions using other
tools of statutory interpretation, and that the "great weight" standard is
80
nothing but a "blimp." Nonetheless, whether "great weight" deference is
meaningful or just a cover, it does reveal that courts view treaties as
requiring at least the appearance of exceptional deference.
Abstention from deciding an issue altogether, under the political question
81
doctrine, is the ultimate form of deference. The Supreme Court articulated
82
the modem doctrine in Baker v. Carr. Although, like Chevron, the modem
doctrine contains a formal component "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department" the outcome often hinges on "prudential," or functional,
83
considerations, particularly in foreign affairs cases. The functional
justifications for abstention under the political question doctrine fall into
two categories. First, there are issues that courts are incompetent to
evaluate because they lack "judicially manageable standards'' or would
require "a policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
84
discretion. " Second, courts should not decide issues that would have
collateral consequences in the form of "embarrassment" or "lack of respect"
85
to the other branches. Despite its declining use in domestic cases, the
86
political question doctrine still has great force in foreign affairs. In fact,
courts have added extra-Baker functional justifications for abstaining in
foreign affairs controversies the difficulty of obtaining extraterritorial
evidence, the high stakes involved, and the extreme sensitivity of these
87
issues.
3.

Reforming and Defending the Doctrines

When the Judiciary has already accommodated superior executive
competence through domestic deference, what justifies special foreign
affairs deference? Although Chevron and Skidmore certainly have their
critics, the foreign affairs deference doctrines have long been the subject of
80. Flaherty, Globalization, supra note 1.
81. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 559-60 (placing the political question doctrine
on the same spectrum as other deference doctrines); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 962 (same).
82. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that apportionment of state legislative districts was
justiciable and not a political question).
83. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 948 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
84 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
85. See id.
86. See generally supra note 1.
87. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952; see also FRANCK, supra note 1, at 46-58 (discussing
cases).
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harsh criticism and proposals for reformation. Prominent foreign relations
scholars, citing Marbury v. Madison's exhortations, view special deference
89
as an abdication of judicial responsibility and call for very little deference.
Seeking a middle path between non-deference and total deference, other
scholars have sought to bring more coherence to the special deference
90
doctrines by exporting domestic deference to foreign affairs.
Chevron has also been deployed in defense of special deference. Eric
Posner and Cass Sunstein use Chevron's functional bases to advocate for
super-strong Chevron deference in foreign affairs cases. Because the
expertise rationale applies with more force in foreign affairs cases and the
accountability rationale is at least as strong, they argue, the courts should
defer to reasonable executive branch interpretations even when they take the
91
form of litigation positions. In other words, this "super-strong Chevron
deference" would have courts apply the easily-satisfied reasonableness
standard of Chevron without the process requirements that limit its
application in domestic cases. It is tantamount to Curtiss- Wright deference.
There is no question that the foreign affairs deference doctrines badly
need clarification, structure, and consistency. Many proposed reforms
address the functional arguments, weighing the pragmatic considerations for

See Chesney, supra note 2, at 1758~70 (describing the range of approaches advocated
by scholars for reforming treaty deference); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 799-804 (same); Nzelibe,
supra note 1, at 956 (describing proposals for limiting the use of the political question doctrine
in foreign affairs).
89. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 1, at 4-5; MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY 313-21 (1990); KOH, supra note 37, at 146--48; David Gray Adler, Court,
Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 19, 19-20 (1996). Curtis Bradley has labeled this the "Marbury perspective,"
which he describes as "a choice between two extremes: either the courts in foreign affairs cases
enforce the "rule of law' against the Executive or they abdicate their judicial function." Bradley,
Chevron, supra note 1, at 650.
90. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 726 (proposing Chevron deference as a tool
"for understanding and limiting deference in this othetwise amorphous area" and flushing out
instances of executive lawmaking); Chesney, supra note 2, at 1729, 1771-74 (proposing an
integrated model "calibrating the degree of deference in a particular case with reference to
considerations including ( 1) the nature of the process employed by the executive branch to
generate the interpretation and (2) the subject matter of the agreement itself'); Evan Criddle,
Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-28 (2003) (arguing
that Skidmore deference is "'a superior paradigm for conceptualizing judicial deference to
executive treaty interpretation"); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 799-804 (describing the range of
approaches to treaty interpretation advocated by scholars); Sullivan, supra note I, at 779, 81214 (assessing the institutional competences of courts and the executive to interpret treaties, and
proposing a '"'Skidmore-style, flexible scale of deference that considers the amount of executive
self-interest and expertise, the type of instrument, and the consistency and process of the
executive interpretation).
91. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1207.
88.
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92

and against particular deference standards. But these proposals do not
engage with the geopolitical theory underlying the doctrines and their
93
functional justifications. Instead, the relative institutional foreign affairs
competences are recited as common-sense observations, sometimes
94
supported with an illustration or two. Yet, as with all pragmatic theories of
interpretation, the results reached depend on the interpreter's assumptions
95
about the world.
A handful of scholars have grounded discussion of functionalist
arguments for deference in a theory of international relations. Jide Nzelibe
defended the continued use of the political question doctrine in foreign
96
affairs cases, using international relations realism as a starting point. For
Nzelibe, the anarchic nature of the international system a core tenet of
realism limits the ability of courts to track the meaning of foreign affairs
97
law, and limits their effectiveness and legitimacy in this area. Similarly,
John Y oo has argued for near-total deference to the President in treaty
interpretation, citing the anarchic and political nature of the international
98
realm.
Other scholars have argued that recent developments in international
relations will undermine the rationales for special deference over time.
These scholars draw upon insights from liberalism, a competing
geopolitical theory that, in contrast to realism, focuses on the internal
characteristics of states, as well as transnational ties among individuals and
99
institutions. Peter Spiro sees the increasing non-govertrmental interaction
among nations and their citizens, the institutionalization of international
relations through transnational entities such as the WTO, and the mobility
of capital as trends that will justify a decline in the use of the political
100
question doctrine in foreign affairs, despite the impact of 9/11. AnneMarie Slaughter argues that the special military-political relations among
liberal states "undertnine the alleged difference between domestic and

92. See. e.g., Ku and Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3; Sullivan, supra note 1.
93. I describe the roots of these justifications in Part II.
94. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1202 (describing the justifications for
special deference in foreign relations as ''often less textual than functional, based on traditional
practices and understandings").
95. Cf. R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional Theories, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 141, 145-61 (2004) (arguing that pragmatic theories of constitutional
interpretation are ultimately dependent on rival theories).
96. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 941.
97. /d. I address these arguments in Part III.
98. See Yoo, Treaty Interpretation, supra note 42, at 1305.
99. See Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504.
I 00. See Spiro, supra note 12, at 649-50.
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foreign affairs" and the justifications for the political question doctrine with
101
respect to those states.
Yet neither of these approaches the dominant realist view and the
alternative liberal view uses as a starting point one of the most salient
features of the twenty-first cen · global system the predominance of the
102
United States. While the realists view special deference through the past
history of great power conflict, the liberal internationalists look to the
future, viewing the decline of special deference as a logical response to
current trends such as globalization and the democratic peace. These
approaches treat the United States as either one of many great powers or
one of many liberal democracies with close ties to other liberal states. As I
discuss in more detail in Part IV, the present international system, as a
whole, corresponds to neither perspective.

C. The Enemy Combatant Cases: Limited Deference
During the years following 9/11, the Supreme Court has made a
substantial departure from the special deference nonn in four habeas cases
103
regarding the detention of "enemy combatants." These cases concerned a
foreign affairs power thought to be least appropriate for judicial oversight104
the authority to wage war.
Rather than apply the special deference
doctrines or abstain from deciding the cases altogether under the stillvibrant political question doctrine in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court
rejected the government's functional rationales for exceptional deference
105
each time.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld addressed the executive branch power to detain
enemy combatants as part of the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and

101. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 1980,2001.
102. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL ORDER & IMPERIAL AMBITION 147 (2006) [hereinafter
IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL].

103. For the purposes of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") proceedings at
Guantanamo, an enemy combatant is defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban oral Qaeda forces," including "any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, (July 7, 2004), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. (ordering the establishment
of CSRT proceedings). However, the Supreme Court utilized a narrower definition of "enemy
combatant" in Hamdi. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U~S. 507, 524 (2004).
104. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 620-24 (2006);
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487-88 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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the process due U.S. citizens who dispute their enemy combatant status.
The government's central argument was functional: given the courts
"limited institutional capabilities . . . in matters of military decisionmaking
in conn·ection with an ongoing conflict,'' courts should eschew evaluation of
individual cases and decide only whether the overall detention scheme was
107
legally authorized. At most, the Court's role was to review for facial
sufficiency a two-page declaration by a Defense Department official who
had reviewed classified documents allegedly providing the legal and factual
108
basis for an individual's detention. The Fourth Circuit had agreed, citing
the expertise and accountability justifications for Curtiss- Wright deference
109
and concluding that "[n]o further factual inquiry is necessary or proper."
110
The Supreme Court rejected these functional arguments. The Court
acknowledged that Congress had authorized the detention of ''enemy
combatants" to prevent return to the battlefield, but it was the Court's role
to independently evaluate the procedures used for a detainee's challenge to
111
his enemy combatant status. The plurality's approach applied a domestic,
112
functional doctrine the Matthews v. Eldridge due process balancing
test to weigh the detainee's liberty interest and the value of additional
procedures against the government's interest in security and the cost of
113
those additional procedures. At a minimum, due process required that ''a
citizen-detainee . . . must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
114
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Rather than try to conform to
115
these requirements, the government released Hamdi.
On the same day as Hamdi, the Court issued its opinion in Rasul v~ Bush,
holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to the alien detainees
7

106. 542 U.S. at 516, 524. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and briefly
held at Guantanamo. /d. at 510-11.
107. !d. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696
(March 29, 2004)).
108. /d. at 527-535.
109. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi Ill), 316 F.3d 450, 459, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing
superior executive expertise, experience, and accountability in warrnaking); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld (Hamdi II), 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Curtiss-Wright and
concluding that its "great deference" extended to the capture and detention of enem,y
combatants).
110. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535.
111. /d.
112. 424 u.s. 319 (1976).
113. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-535.
114. /d. at 533.
115. See Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15.
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116

held at Guantanamo. The Rasul holding hinged on interpretation of the
117
habeas statute, but Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, directly addressed,
118
and rejected, the government's functional arguments. While conceding
that there was "a realm of political authority over military affairs where the
judicial power may not enter," Justice Kennedy concluded that the military
119
exigencies were not sufficient to deny habeas to the detainees.
Guantanamo is "in every practical respect a United States territory, and ...
120
is ... far removed from any hostilities.'' And while ''detention without
proceedings or trial would be justified by military necessity for a matter of
weeks," after months and years "the case for continued detention to meet
121
military exigencies becomes weaker." There was little deference to the
government's asserted foreign policy requirements.
122
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court declared unlawful the military
commissions established in 2001 to try a handful of the Guantanamo
123
detainees for war crimes. Hamdan was an across-the-board refusal to
124
The majority concluded that the
defer to the executive branch.
commissions violated the Unifortn Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and
125
the Geneva Conventions. In rejecting the government's interpretations,
126
the Court declined to apply any of the foreign affairs deference doctrines.
The UCMJ required that military commission rules be the same as for
courts martial "insofar as practicable," and the President's determination of
127
impracticability lacked any supporting record.
Under Curtiss- Wright

116. 542 u.s. 466, 467 (2004 ).
117. /d. at 476 (distinguishing the facts of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 777
( 1950), and relying on an intervening change in the understanding for the basis of statutory
habeas jurisdiction).
118. /d. at 486-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. /d. at 487-88.
120. !d. at 487.
121. /d.
122. 548 u.s. 557 (2006).
123. /d. at 635. As of August 2008, a dozen Guantanamo detainees have been formally
charged. Human Rights Watch, US: Hamdan Trial Exposes Flaws in Military Commissions
(Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/06/us-hamdan-trial-exposes-flawsmi litary-commissions.
124. See Eskridge and Baer, supra note 56, at 1219-21 (describing the Court's approach in
Hamdan as ••anti-deference").
125. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597-602.
126. The Court did not explicitly apply Chevron deference either. See Ku and Yoo,
Hamdan, supra note 3, at 179, 185-86.
127. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620-24 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)). See also Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000), amended by Military Commissions Act of
2006, 10 u.s.c. § 836 (2006).
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deference, such a record would not be required. The commissions were
unlawful because, unlike courts martial, they denied defendants the right to
be present at trial and allowed hearsay evidence, including evidence
129
obtained through coercion. Then, without invoking "great weight" treaty
deference, the Court rejected the government's interpretation of Common
130
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court held that Common
Article 3, which covered individuals involved in armed conflicts "not of an
international character," applied to Hamdan because this phrase meant all
131
conflicts not between nation-states, including the war with al Qaeda. The
military commissions, the Court concluded, violated Common Article 3 's
132
requirement that defendants be tried by a "regularly constituted court. "
The military commissions ground to a halt.
During 2006, a previously docile Congress finally began to address the
legal quagmire created by the enemy combatant detention policy, passing
two statutes purporting to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo
detainees and replace it with a limited, direct appeal to the D.C. Circuit
133
from the military's enemy combatant determination.
Boumediene v.
134
Bush,
a 5-4 decision declaring the habeas-stripping provision
unconstitutional, stands out as a very rare rebuff to both the executive
branch and Congress in foreign affairs. The Court held that the Guantanamo
detainees had a constitutional right to habeas and that the alternative was an
inadequate substitute because it did not provide detainees the opportunity to
introduce new evidence to rebut the government's, nor did the alternative
135
empower the D.C. Circuit to order a detainee's release.
128. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 718-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Curtiss-Wright and
noting the failure of the majority to apply special deference).
129. See id. at 613-25 (plurality opinion).
130. /d. at 632.
131. See id.; see also Co-MMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949:
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR

4-5

(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
132. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635. A different, non-controlling plurality also concluded that
the commissions departed from customary international law the law of aitned conflict in
charging Hamdan with conspiracy. See id. at 677.
133. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 44
(2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.
(2006)), purported to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees and replace it with
exclusive, but limited, review of CSRT proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. The Military
Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and
scatterd sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), inter alia, reestablished the military commissions and eliminated habeas corpus for all aliens designated as
••enemy combatants,, or awaiting a deterntination of that status.
134. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
135. /d. at 2250.
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The opinions encapsulated the state of the current debates about foreign
affairs powers. While both the majority and the dissents gave credence to
136
formalist, originalist approaches
examining the reach of habeas as it
would have been understood at the Founding both sides ultimately turned
137
to functionalism. Front-and-center were fundamental disagreements about
the most effective roles for the Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary in
foreign affairs.
As with the originalist stalemates in foreign affairs scholarship, Justice
Kennedy"s majority opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent reached conflicting
conclusions about whether the original understanding of the Great Writ's
138
reach extended to aliens at Guantanamo.
Finding the history
"indeterminate," the majority turned to functional considerations, looking
beyond Guantanamo' s formal status as sovereign Cuban territory and
making an independent assessment of the govennnent' s claimed military
139
exigencies. Excluding habeas at Guantanamo would give the political
140
branches "the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will. " On the
other hand, the Court concluded, "[t]he Government presents no credible
arguments that the military mission . . . would be compromised if habeas
141
corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims." The majority
was careful to place limits on the reach of habeas during war and
emphasized time as an important factor. Habeas would be available
sometime well after capture, and only after the executive branch had made
its own determination of the detainee's status; and extra allowances should
142
be made for domestic, emergency situations.
Nevertheless, the Court had refused to deploy special deference to the
executive branch's foreign policy assessments, and the dissenters were
livid. Chief Justice Roberts lamented that the American people had lost "a
bit more control over the conduct of this Nation's foreign policy to
143
unelected, politically unaccountable judges." He argued that the detainees
144
were actually worse off than they had been without habeas. Justice Scalia
136. /d. at 2248, 2275-77; see id. at 2294-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. /d. at 2259 (majority opinion); id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Compare id. at 2248-49 (majority opinion) (concluding that intent and history were
indeterminate on this question) with id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the -·writ
does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad").
139. See id. at 2259 (majority opinion).
140. /d.
141. Id. at 2261.
142. /d. at 2275-77 (explaining that where it would impose 'onerous burdens on the
Government ... [courts] would be required to devise sensible rules for staying habeas corpus
proceedings until the Government can comply with its requirements in a responsible way").
143. /d. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
144. /d. at 2294.
4
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accused the majority of ''faux deference,'' contending that it had ~'blundered
in" where it was incompetent to "second-guess" the political branches'
145
decisions about ''how to handle enemy prisoners in this war." He bluntly
declared that the decision ''will almost certainly cause more Americans to
146
be killed."
Seemingly in response, the majority suggested that the times called 'for a
new paradigm of role effectiveness in foreign affairs. "If, as some fear,
terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come," the
majority reasoned, the Court may have to define the ''outer boundaries;' of
147
the war powers. But the Court invited the political branches to "engage in
a g,enuine debate''' about "how best to preserve constitutional values while
protecting the Nation from terrorism." In the war on terror, the Court's
institutional legitimacy would benefit the Executive, whose exercise of
power is "vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial
148
Branch. " Boumediene indicates a move away from special deference in foreign
affairs, at least in the area of the detention of enemy combatants. Although
the Court in Boumediene cited Curtiss-Wright, it did not afford anything
149
like Curtiss-Wright deference.
In approaches to constitutional
interpretation, foreign affairs still makes a difference functional
considerations dominate over fonnal ones. But the post-9/11 enemy
combatant cases are virtually unprecedented in their rejection of the
executive's functional arguments. This could very well mark the beginning
of a new understanding of the courts' role in foreign affairs. In the rest of
the Article, I explain how theories of international relations support such a
change.
II.

THE REALIST ROOTS OF SPECIAL DEFERENCE

The special deference doctrines derive from general understandings
about the desired institutional competences in foreign affairs. Americ,a 's
ability to function and thrive as a sovereign nation is believed to depend on
executive branch competences because of the way the world operates. That
understanding of the world is essentially international relations realism.
145. /d. at 2296, 2296 n.1 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
146. Id. at 2296.
147. /d. at 2277 (majority opinion).
148. /d.
149. /d. at 2276-77 ("In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to
impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political
branches.").
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This section describes the key tenets of realism. It then offers an account
of how a lay version of realism became part of judicial discourse, largely
through the enormously influential Curtiss-Wright decision in 1936. The
perceived exigencies of the Cold War reinforced the realist basis for special
deference.

A. Realism
Realism, in one form or another, has long been a prominent paradigm of
15
international relations. ° For 2000 years, political philosophers and
scientists from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides to the Renaissance
Italian writer Nicolo Machiavelli to modem political scientists such as E.H.
Carr, George F. Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Hans J. Morganthau have
relied on realist assumptions about the world. Their shared understanding
was that nation states (rather than individuals or institutions) are the basic
units of action in world affairs, that each nation seeks to maximize its own
151
This
power, and that states behave in more or less rational ways.
"classical realism" focused on statecraft and saw the drive for power as a
152
result of fundamental human nature.
A recent incarnation, called ~'neorealism" or "structural realism," was
153
articulated in its most influential form by Kenneth Waltz in 1979.
150. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 1999; Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew
Moravcsik, Is Anybo(}y Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SEC. 2, 5~6 (1999) (discussing the
"degeneration" of realist theory after the end of the Cold War but observing that it '(oremains the
primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general
theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs''); Robert Keohane, Theory of World
Politics: Structural Rf!alism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 158 (Robert 0.
Keohane ed., 1986) (''For over 2000 years, what Hans J. Morganthau dubbed ~Political Realism'
has constituted the principal tradition for the analysis of international relations in Europe and its
offshoots in the New World.").
151. Keohane, Neorea/ism, supra note 15, at 7-9,211 (discussing Machiavelli's influence
on realism).
152. For major works in the classical realist tradition, see, for example, E.H. CARR, THE
TWENTY YEARS: CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2d ed. 1964) (describing realism as opposed to '-utopianism"); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER .AND PEACE (7th ed.
2006) (setting forth a systematic account of political realism); GEORGE F. KENNAN,_AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY: EXPANDED EDITION (1984); HENRY KISSINGER,_ DIPLOMACY (1994); MARTIN
WIGHT, POWER POLITICS (2d ed. 1986) (analyzing the failure of the League of Nations to affect
international anarchy). For a recent realist argument that the optimism during the 1990s about
enduring peace among nations w~s similarly misplaced, see JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (200 1).
153. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79-98 (1979) [hereinafter
WALTZ, THEORYl Waltz and other realists acknowledge that the actual interactions of nations

will often depart significantly from these assumptions, but observe that the value of descriptive
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Building on the work of Hans Morganthau and others, Waltz sought to
systematize political realism by focusing on the structure of the
154
international order as a way of explaining the behavior of states. In
Waltz·;s theory, only three variables comprise the model: (1) the degree of
order in the system, (2) the function of units in the system, and (3) the
155
relative capabilities of those units. But two of these variables are fixedan international system is always anarchic, and all of its units, nation states,
have identical functions. Thus the only salient difference among nations is
156
the distribution ofpower. This parsimonious theory has been described as
157
"billiard balls" colliding.
Although. Waltz's spare brand of realism is not universally accepted
among realists, its tripartite model provides a useful template for describing
realism in general and the ways in which it has influenced the courts' and
58
scholars) functional justifications for special deference} As I discuss
below, it is also useful for explaining why many of the justifications are no
longer viable. It is therefore worth discussing each aspect in more detail.
1.

Anarchy

When the realists describe the international realm as anarchic, they do
not mean that the world is necessarily violent, but that power is
159
decentralized. Although there are international laws and institutions, there
160
is no world government with the power to enforce laws. The United
Nations and the World Bank have no army or navy. Without such governing
accuracy must be weighed against the greater explanatory and predictive pow.er of a
parsimonious theory. Kenneth N. Waltz, Law and Theories, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 27,
34 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986).
154. Kenneth N. Waltz, Political Structures, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 70, 72
(Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Structures].
155. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 153, at 97.
156. Seeid.
157. A. WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
19-24 (1962); Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 256.
158. I use Waltz's framework because it has been highly influential, and because it adheres
closely to prior versions of realism, the insights of which would likely have been perceived as
common wisdom by many educated laypersons. Nonetheless, realism has continued to evolve,
and many realists depart significantly from Waltz's views. For example, "offensive realists"
part company with Waltz's structural realism because they conclude that all states seek to
dominate rather than merely survive. See, e.g., MEARSHEIMER, supra note 152, at 20-21. For a
discussion of the evolution of realism since 1979, see generally Legro & Moravcsik, supra note
150.
159. Kenneth N. Waltz, Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power, in NEOREALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 98, 112 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Anarchic Orders].
160. See MEARSHElMER, supra note 152, at 30, 51.
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authority, nations can never be sure if others will abide by agreements or
161
international law, and they have no means of enforcing those agreements.
162
They must engage in self-help. Because states' interests shift over time,
163
"the world is in flux. "
Realists draw a sharp distinction between the anarchic international
realm and the domestic re.alm which is characterized by order and
hierarchy. According to Waltz, "In]ational politics is the realm of authority,
of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of
struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a
64
political one,."J
2.

Sovereign States with Identical Functions

According to realists, sovereign states are the fundamental unit of the
international realm. A state is sovereign in that it "decides for itself how it
165
will cope with its internal and external problems." Each nation is
166
"opaque," having a unified relationship with the rest of the world. And
nations are alike in function because they provide the same things to their
citizens welfare, security, rule of law though they may do so in different
167
ways_. These identically-functioning nation-states are the whole ball
game: realist theory discounts the role of transnational institutions, ideas,
and internal characteristics of states in determining outcomes in
international politics.

3.

168

The Balance of Power and Realpolitik

In an anarchic realm populated by nation-states that perfortn the same
functions, states are distinguished from one another only by their power.
"The units of greatest capability set the scene of action" for the rest, and so
a "general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great

161. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views oflnternational Law, 96 AM. Soc'v INT'L

L. PROC. 265, 268 (2002) ("It is naive to expect that a stable international order can be erected
on normative principles embodied in international law.").
162. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 152, at 51; Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note 159, at 100.
163. MORGENTHAU, supra note 152, -at 4-16.
164. WALTZ, THEORY, supra note 153, at 113.
165. /d.
166. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 5.
167. Waltz, Structures, supra note 154, at 91-92.
168. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 5.
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powers." Neo-realists categorize the international system according to the
170
number of great powers. A system with two great powers such as the
Cold War system dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States is
bipolar. A system with more great powers is multipolar.
The result of power differentials in the world, realists predict, is a
balance of power. The efforts of each great power to maximize its own
capabilities will necessarily result in an equilibrium as weaker powers align
171
to counterbalance stronger ones.
The structure of the system changes
when great powers rise or fall, usually through war. Without a central
authority willing or able to intervene in world affairs, each state must be
172
prepared to use force to survive. Realists have tended to prioritize issues
173
surrounding the use or potential use of the military.
Realists also make normative claims, which I will refer to as
114
realpolitik. For most realists, including Waltz, the great powers in the
175
international system should seek stability and avoid major war. Because a
balance of power is the arrangement least likely to lead to war, realists see it
176
as a goal of foreign policy as well as a prediction about state behavior.

169. Kenneth N. Waltz, Reductionist, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 47, 61 (Robert 0.
Keohane ed., 1986) [hereinafter Waltz, Reductionist].
170. Realists define a great power as '"'a nation that can hold its own in a war with any other
nation." Craig, supra note 9, at 168.
171. Some confusion surrounds the term "balance of power," which has been used in
several different ways. It can mean, inter alia, an actual, even distribution of power, the
nortnative principle that power should be evenly distributed, or the tendency of the international
system to produce an even distribution of power. See generally MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE
BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY 2-4 (2000).
172. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504; Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note
159 at I 11-12.
173. Slaughter, International, supra note 18, at 504.
174. Realpolitik does not have a precise meaning in international relations. It was originally
used to describe ''policies of limited objectives which had a reasonable chance of success," but
became a broader term for the European diplomatic tradition developed during the Seventeenth
through the Nineteenth Centuries, which emphasized the need for broad discretion in
conducting states' external affairs and the duty of statesmen from the great powers to "maintain
an international order in which no one state dominates the rest." MARTIN GRIFFITHS, FIFTY KEY
THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 26 (1999) [hereinafter GRIFFITHS, THINKERS]
(discussing Henry Kissinger's theory and approach to foreign affairs and foreign policy). It is
often associated with Henry Kissinger, who defined it as "foreign policy based on calculations
of power and the national interest." KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 137. It is also used as a
synonym for realism. See, e.g., John K. Setear, Room for Law: Realism, Evolutionary Biology,
and the Promise(s) ofInternational Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, I n.3 (2005).
175. Craig, supra note 9, at 144; KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 34 (noting the "European
concept of raison d'etat, which asserted that a state's actions can only be judged by their
success").
176. Id.
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Realpolitik requires flexibility. Because the world is anarchic and in flux,
a nation must be willing to violate its own agreements and international law
if necessary to advance its interests. Machiavelli wrote that the Prince may
be obliged to "act against his promise, against charity, against humanity,
and against religion'' and "that he have a mind ready to tum itself according
to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of political affairs
177
require. " Acts that would be repugnant in a domestic context are fair
178
game in the wider world. States must not be constrained by international
179
law if it is contrary to their interests. A flexible foreign policy requires
that it be conducted by an elite group of statesmen from the great powers
who know one another, can make decisions swiftly, operate in secret if
180
necessary, and can work out among them a stable balance ofpower.
B. Special Deference and Realism-Curtiss-Wright
Realism is particularly compatible with functional methods of
constitutional interpretation. The demands of realpolitik require ultimate
flexibility and discretion, but formalist modes of interpretation impose
absolute limits on the exercise of power. It was functionalism that enabled
realism to become part of constitutional foreign affairs law.
Although realist and functionalist conceptions of presidential power were
181
expressed from the beginning especially by Alexander Hamilton realist ideas did not begin to enter judicial discourse until the early
twentieth century. The turn to realism was embodied in Curtiss-Wright,
which rejected a challenge, on non-delegation grounds, to a joint resolution
empowering the President to enforce a criminal prohibition on the sale of
182
arms in the Unite.d States to countries engaged in a war in South America.
177. NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61 (Peter Bondanella trans., Oxford University

Press 2005).
178. This is the concept of raison d'etat, or "reason of the state;" part of the tradition of
realpolitik. See supra note 175.
179. See, e.g., Krasner, supra note 161,. at 268; see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF
LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER INTERVENTIONISM .A FTER KOSOVO 84 (2001) (concluding that
~'the use of force among states simply is no longer subject if it ever was subject to the rule of
law"); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005)
(''[l]ntemational law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests . . and
the distribution of state power.;,).
180. GRIFFITHS, THINKERS, supra note 174, at 26 (explaining that Henry Kissinger believed
that the struggle for power in the international system ''may be contained if the _great powers are
led by individuals who can contrive a 'legitimate' order, and work out between them some
consensus on the limits within which the struggle should be controlled").
181. See Pearlstein, supra note 28; see also KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 32-36.
182. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
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Under the resolution, the President could choose when to impose the
embargo and when to end it, and could make exceptions to its
183
implementation, or set limits to its terms, without congressional approval.
This resolution seemed like a non-starter under the courts' then-strict
184
application of the non-delegation doctrine. But the Court, drawing a clear
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs in constitutional law and
advancing a controversial theory of extra-constitutional powers, approved
the broad delegation of power to the President and offered a paean to the
practical importance of an executive-centered constitutional foreign affairs
185
framework.
Curtiss- Wright has not fared well among scholars. Its broad
pronouncements about foreign affairs and its theory of extra-constitutional
186
powers have been repeatedly savaged. But Curtiss- Wright continues to be
cited for the proposition that the President takes the lead role in foreign
affairs, and it is still the most thorough explanation by a court for why this
187
should be so. Curtiss- Wright also makes clear the realist roots of the
functionalist explanations for deference to the President by the courts. This
subpart discusses the roots of Curtiss- Wright" s realism and its impact on the
special deference doctrines.
1.

The Early Republic

The Framers were aware of realist ideas. Alexander Hamilton, whom
Fareed Zakaria called ''the realist father figure," drew a connection between
188
the demands of the anarchic world and strong executive power. In the
Federalist, he wrote that because "the circumstances that endanger the
safety of nations are infinite, no constitutional shackles can wisely be

183. Id. at 312.
184. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1 ( 1999).
185. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
186. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 37, at 94 (describing 'fowithering criticism" of CurtissWright); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv.
1617, 1659 (1997) (referring to Curtiss-Wright as "the bete noire of U.S. foreign relations
law'').
187. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (describing CurtissWright's "historical gloss on the -executive Power"' of Article II, which confers on the
President the "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations" (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))).
188. FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S
ROLE IN THE WORLD 97, 181 ( 1998) [hereinafter ZAKARIA, WEALTH].
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imposed on the power to which the care of it is conrmitted." And the
President is better suited than Congress for conducting the realpolitik
necessary in foreign affairs: ''Decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
190
degree than the proceedings of any greater number."
However, the courts did not adopt or discuss such functionalist
institutional competence assumptions. As Edward White explained in a
seminal account, formalism dominated constitutional foreign affairs
jurisprudence for most of the 19th Cen
. Courts adhered to an
"orthodox" separation of powers framework in foreign affairs, in which
powers were distributed among the branches of the federal government "in
accordance with a traditional, formal structure of constitutionally delegated
191
and reserved powers." Under this orthodox framework, courts exercised
their power to interpret foreign affairs statutes and treaties, cabining
192
deference under the political question doctrine to a limited set of issues.
These included declarations of war or peace, jurisdiction over foreign
territory, the President's recognition of foreign governments, determination
of territorial boundaries under treaties, and whether a foreign government
193
had the power to ratify a treaty. However, rather than abstaining from
deciding the controversies altogether, the courts accepted the political
194
branches' determinations as conclusive.
Executive interpretations of
treaties received little-to-no deference from courts, and were often
195
rejected.
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see
also Pearlstein, supra note 28 (discussing the use of Hamilton by advocates of strong executive
power after 9/11).
191. White, supra note 184, at 3.
192. See id; Chesney, supra note 2, at 1734 4 1 (describing courts' approach to treaty
interpretation in the nineteenth century as consistent with Professor White's narrative).
193. See, e.g., United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, 27 F. Cas. 284,
288 (E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,941) ('"The judiciary, under the constitution, cannot declare war or
make peace."); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1401 n.15 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Formalism]
(listing cases).
194. See Goldsmith, Formalism, supra note 193, at 1400; White, supra note 184, at 27
(''But even in those areas, nineteenth-century courts were willing to investigate facts and to
ground their decisions on legal principles, sometimes invoking those principles in support of
policies declared by Congress or the Executive."); see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212 (1890) (holding that international law justified legislation pertnitting the Executive to take
possession of a "guano" island and that the question of who was sovereign on the island was a
political one).
195. David Sloss, Judicial D~ference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506-08 (2007) (surveying decisions
interpreting treaties in the first fifty years of the Supreme Court and concluding that the Court
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From a realist perspective, the formalist jurisprudence makes sense. At
its birth, the United States was not yet a great power, though the others saw
196
it as a potential threat. For the most part, early American foreign policy
was isolationist, seeking to avoid entanglements with the European powers
that had been warring for centuries. In fact, the separation of powers was
designed, or at least served, to institutionalize America's diplomatic
197
isolation. When the United States later became capable of engaging more
fully with the rest of the world, this put increasing strain on the orthodox
•
regtme.
2.

A Great Power

By the 1930s, the orthodox regime of constitutional foreign relations law
had collapsed. Replacing it was doctrine recognizing a strong distinction
between ·domestic and foreign realms of constitutional law, centralizing
power in the Executive, and a discourse that emphasized superior executive
198
competence in foreign affairs. Edward White has traced the subtle moves
toward functionalism in constitutional interpretation in the early twentieth
199
,cen
that laid the groundwork for the new regime. Gradually, legal
scholars began to conceive of constitutional powers as functionalist rather
than essentialist. This led naturally to a weighing of institutional
competences in determining the allocation of powers among the branches of
200
govertunent, rather than discerning limits that are already pre-ordained. .
But the executive discretion aspect of Curtiss-Wright can be traced, not
only to the rise of functionalism in constitutional interpretation, but the
changing nature of the U.S. govermnent. During the ,early twentieth cen
,
did not defer at all to Executive interpretations). But see John Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty
Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL.. L. REv. 1305, 1310-11 (2002)
(analyzing the Vesting Clause from an originalist perspective and concluding that the Framers
intended a limited role for the judiciary in treaty interpretation).
196. ROBERT KAGAN, DANGEROUS NATION 3 (2006) ("Most Americans today would be
surprised to know that much of the world regarded America, even in its infancy, as a very
dangerous nation.").
197. KISSINGER, supra note 152, at 32-36; Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution:
Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 678-79 (1998). David
Sloss has demonstrated, in a study of early Supreme Court cases and related materials, that the
federal courts played an active role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy during the 1790s by
providing a non-executive branch forum for the resolution of disputes involving privateers. See
generally David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L . J.
145 (2008).
198. White, supra note 184, at 2.
199. See generally id.
200. /d. at 47.
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the Presidency steadily grew in power relative to other branches of
government, along with the size of the federal bureaucracy and the scope of
domestic federal regulation, culminating in the New Deal. As presidential
power increased, foreign policy activism increased with it in mutually
201
reinforcing ways.
The devastation of World War I and the unstable international situation
202
Totalitarian
following it provided the backdrop for Curtiss-Wright.
regimes in the Soviet Union, Japan, Gennany, and Italy seemed unlikely to
abide by international law and increasingly sought their foreign policy goals
through force or the threat of force. The 1930s saw the globe carved up by
the great powers into closed, competing economic blocs a German sphere
of influence, the Japan-dominated "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere," and a British imperial preferential system, among others that
imperiled America's access to vital markets and raw materials in Europe
203
and Asia. As one scholar has observed, the 1930s demonstrated that the
United States could not "remain as a great industrial power within the
204
confines of the Western hemisphere. "
The hostile world of the 1930s and '40s also provoked a crisis in the
American foreign policy establishment and in the related community of
international law scholars, who had, for most of the century, adhered to a
205
Classicist
decidedly non-realist, "classicist" approach to the world.
statesmen and scholars in the early twentieth cen
"hailed the creation of
a new international legal order that could break out of what they believed
206
They asserted that
was the discredited balance-of-power system. "
disputes among nations could be peacefully resolved through neutral,
apolitical international institutions and principles, the recognition of shared
mutual interests reflected in the law, and without resort to the use of
207
force. The quintessential classicist document is the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact, a multilateral treaty outlawing war as an instrument of national policy
201. ZAKARIA, WEALTH, supra note 188, at 10-11.
202. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 1739; White, supra note 184, at 98.
203. IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 150-51.
204. /d. at 151.
205. See Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty
Years· Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 583, 584-602 (2004) [hereinafter Zasloff, Crisis] (describing
classicism and its origins as part of a narrative about its influence on U.S. foreign policy from
1921 to 1933, when "lawyers directed much of America's relations with the outside world");
see also Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded
Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 239, 247-57 (2003) (describing the origins and early
influence of foreign policy classicism in more depth).
206. Zasloff, Crisis, supra note 205, at 584.
207. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM.
J. INT'L L. 64, 65-70 (2006).

41:0087]

AMERICAN HEGEMONY

121

208

but without any enforcement mechanism. The events of the 30s and the
209
outbreak of World War II seemed to explode classicist principles. After
the war, realism would replace classicism as the basis of U.S. foreign policy
and dominate American international law scholarship through the Cold
War.2Io

3.

The Realism of Curtiss- Wright

Despite some formalist language, Curtiss- Wright is a realist and
functionalist decision. It essentially draws on all three major realist tenetsanarchy, unitary states, and realpolitik to create a new paradigm for
courts' treatment of foreign affairs issues. The author of the majority
opinion, Justice George Sutherland, had caused trouble for the New Deal as
211
one of the "Four Horsemen" generally hostile to expansive federal power.
At the same time, Sutherland saw the need for the United States to respond
212
effectively to the turtnoil of international events. The approach he took in
Curtiss- Wright enabled him to preserve the domestic regime of limited and
enumerated powers by distinguishing the foreign from the domestic while
providing the executive branch with the discretion it needed to carry out
foreign policy.
Sutherland's opinion expressed the realist principle that foreign and
domestic affairs are radically different because the outside world functions
213
in a different way. In realism, there is a sharp distinction between the
hierarchy that characterizes a state"s internal society and the anarchy that
characterizes the international system. The Curtiss- Wright court drew the
same distinction: unlike the domestic environment governed by separation
of powers and federalism, the international system was a "vast external
214
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems."
208. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; see
Zasloff, Crisis, supra note 205, at 629 (concluding that the Pact was a (,'completely useless
paper instrument, greeted with extraordinary fanfare and delusions of grandeur'').
209. For a revered realist study of the failures of classicism in the inter-war period, see
CARR, supra note 152, at 63-94.
210. Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 207, at 71.
211. Michael Allan Wolf, George Sutherland, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 449, 449 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
212. Sutherland delivered a version of his theory in a series of lectures at Columbia in
1919, a month after the Armistice ending World War I. See White, supra note 184, at 57.
213. See Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American Internment as Foreign
Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 194-202 (1998) (discussing Curtiss-Wright as a realist
decision); Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2000 (same).
214. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319 (1936).
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Curtiss-Wright's expansive view of executive power clashed with that same
Court's enforcing strict limitations on federal power in particular,
215
delegation of lawmaking to the executive branch in the domestic realm.
A second, and the most controversial, aspect of Curtiss-Wright reflected
the realist assumption that states are the sole unitary actors in the
international political arena. Drawing on his own earlier work, Sutherland
asserted that very broad delegations of power to the Executive in foreign
affairs did not offend constitutional separation-of-powers principles because
the national government's foreign relations powers derived, at least in part,
from extra-constitutional sources. For Sutherland, these "powers of external
sovereignty" belong to all nations by virtue of their status as members "of
216
the international family." The inherent powers were, therefore, transferred
directly to the national govermnent of the United States from the British
Crown upon independence. Because these powers never belonged to the
States, they were not delegated to the federal government by the
217
Constitution. In realist terms, then, these powers were "dictated by the
218
autonomous logic of the international system." Sutherland's "inherent
powers'' thesis does not fully explain, but certainly suggests, why the
President, rather than Congress, should be given the lead role in foreign
affairs. Unlike Congress, the President is a unitary actor, like the nation
itself, with respect to the rest of the world.
The third, and most important, innovation in Curtiss-Wright was both
realist and functionalist it drew a direct connection between the
requirements of the international realm and particular executive branch
competences. Here again, the Court's reasoning sounded in international
relations realism. Just as from a realist perspective the anarchic character of
the world system requires balancing by the great powers and the exercise of
realpolitik by statesmen, Curtiss-Wright paints a picture of the President,
unfettered by domestic law or other branches of the govermnent, pursuing
the interests of the United States in the arena with other great powers
carefully balancing one another. Sutherland offered functional justifications
for the President role as the "sole organ" in foreign affairs and why it would

215. The Court considered Curtiss-Wright shortly after it had struck down three early-New
Deal regulatory statutes, twice on non-delegation grounds. See, e~g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 314-17 (1936) (Sutherland, J.). (invalidating a 1935 statute setting minimum
prices and establishing collective bargaining in the coal industry); White, supra note 184, at
100-01.
216. Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
217. White, supra note 184, at 104-05.
218. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2000.
.
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be unwise for the Court to require Congress "to lay down narrowly definite
219
standards by which the President is to be govemed."
Sutherland took founding-era functional justifications for vesting treaty
negotiation power with the President and extrapolated them to the entire
220
foreign affairs arena. The President was in the position to "know[] the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries" through "confidential sources
of information" and "his agents in the fortn of diplomatic, consular, and
221
other officials."
Involving other branches in diplomacy could be
"productive of hannful results" because secrecy would be harder to
223
222
maintain.
One goal was to avoid embarrassment.
For support,
Sutherland quoted from an 1816 Senate committee report concluding that
the "nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and
unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and
224
dispatch. "
Sutherland's opinion thus established the core set of functional
justifications expertise, avoiding embarrassment, uniformity, flexibility,
speed, and secrecy that are the pillars of special deference.
4.

Realism After Curtiss- Wright

Curtiss-Wright provided the basis for increased deference across the
spectrum of foreign affairs doctrines. As David Gray Adler put it, even
when Curtiss-Wright's "sole organ" concept was "not invoked by name, its
spirit, indeed its talismanic aura, has provided a common thread in a pattern
225
of cases that has exalted presidential power above constitutional nonns."
The Curtiss-Wright revolution continued during the 1930s and 40s, as the
international situation worsened and led to war. The Court recognized
further expansions of executive power while further curtailing its own
26
power by increasing deference. In United States v. Belmonf and United
219. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319, 322.
220. The "sole organ" language was taken, out of context, from a speech by John Marshall,

then a Congressman. See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998).
221. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
222. See id.; see also White, supra note 184, at 106.
223. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
224. !d. at 319. These were the same executive competences listed by Alexander Hamilton.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
225. Adler, supra note 89, at 25; see also White, supra note 184, at 48 (describing Justice
Sutherland as ua singularly influential force in the transfortnation of constitutional foreign
relations jurisprudence").
226. 301 u.s. 324, 330-33 (1937).
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221

the Court held that the Roosevelt Administration's
agreement, through an exchange of letters, to -recognize the Soviet Union
and seize Soviet assets in the U.S. without congressional approval or via
the treaty-making process was supreme federal law, overruling
inconsistent state law. The propriety of the agreement, Justice Douglas
228
wrote in Pink, was a political question "not open to judicial inquiry. " In a
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter famously de-c lared that the nation "speaks
229
with one voice" in foreign affairs. Belmont and Pink thus authorized an
expansion of the President's power to make foreign affairs law, even
affecting the private property of U.S. citizens, and near-total judicial
deference to even very broad foreign policy means e.g., claim
settlement in can'ying out his power to recognize foreign governments.
230
World War II was the high-water mark for special deference. During
this period, the executive branch used military commissions to try hundreds
of thousands of cases, and the courts took an extremely deferential
231
232
approach. In Ex Parte Quirin , the Court upheld the President's use of
special military commissions to try eight Nazi saboteurs, including two U.S.
citizens, arrested in the United States in 1942. The commissions were
established by two short executive orders providing broad parameters for
233
the trials without any implementing regulations. After the war, in 1946,
the Court upheld the use of a commission to try a Japanese general for
failing to prevent his troops in the Philippines from committing war
234
crimes. In that case, In re Yamashita, the Court deferred to the President's
235
determinations of military necessity. It declined to review the legality of
using commissions away from the battlefield and after the end of active
236
hostilities. Nor would the Court review the procedural rules used by the
commission, and it deferred to the President's interpretation of the Geneva
237
Conventions. This extreme deferenc·e prompted passionate dissents from
Justices Murphy and Rutledge, who argued that America's position of
strength in the post-war world required the courts to play an independent
'

227. 315 u.s. 203, 231 (1942).
228. Id. at 223.
229. Id. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
230. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (calling Ex parte Quirin the
"high-water mark" for judicial deference); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942).
231. Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 207~8.
232. 317 u.s. 1' 47--48 (1942).
233 Id. at 32-35.
234. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946).
235. Id. at 12-15.
236. /d.
237. /d. at 21-25.
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role. Because the United States was working to create "a new era of law in
the world," Rutledge insisted, it must adhere to its own "greatest traditions
238
of administering justice." Japan, a defeated and occupied power, could
not bargain with the U.S. to assert its rights because it no longer held U.S.
239
prisoners. Rutledge concluded: "[C]ertainly, if there was the need of an
independent neutral to protect her nationals during the war, there is more
240
now [that the war had ended]. "
Justice Rutledge's plea for the courts to provide a check on executive
power perhaps reflected the brief period of American global predominance
241
in the late 1940s. But by 1950, the Soviet Union's blunt assertions of
power and development of.n uclear weapons had made it clear that the world
would be a bipolar one, and the U.S. once more needed to tend to the
242
balance of power in Europe. That year, the Court again upheld the use of
243
military commissions in Eisentrager. The Court would not examine the
commission's procedural rules or the political branches' implementation of
244
the Geneva Conventions.
And once more, the Court deferred to the
executive branch's factual assessments of military necessity: citing CurtissWright, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that commissions were
unwarranted in view of the fact that there were no hostilities or martial law
245
at the time the acts were committed.
The Curtiss- Wright brand of special foreign affairs deference became
firmly entrenched during the Cold War under a cloud of Soviet
expansionism and the risk of nuclear conflict. What Joel Paul has called "a
discourse of executive expediency" in U.S. politics influenced judicial
246
discourse.
The geopolitical situation seemed to require an increased
ability for courts to shape their judgments to exec·utive needs, particularly
247
during crises.
During the 1960s, which were marked by high-tension
238. /d. at 43 (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
239. /d. at 78.
240. /d.
241. See IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 25-26 ("Viewed in terms of material
capabilities, the United States did occupy an overwhelmingly powerful position at the close of
the War.").
242. /d. at 30-31.
243. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
244. Id. at 789 n.l4.
245. /d. at 789-90.
246. Paul, supra note 197, at 671-72.
247. Goldsmith, Formalism, supra note 193, 1408-09. The prominent exception to special
deference during this period is, arguably, the Steel Seizure Case. See Youngstown v. Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 580 (1952) (declaring unlawful President Truman's extralegislative seizure of domestic steel mills during the Korean War). However, although
Youngstown is often discussed as a foreign affairs case, Justice Jackson, in his celebrated
concurrence, viewed the exercise of presidential power at issue as essentially domestic. See id.
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events such as the 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis, the courts articulated stronger
deference standards and evoked functional justifications for deference in
foreign affairs. In a 1961 decision, Kolovrat v~ Oregon, the Supreme Court,
for the first time, concluded that the executive branch's interpretations of
248
treaties were entitled to "great weight. " Baker v. Carr, decided the
249
following year, brought a revolution in the political question doctrine.
Rather than applying the classical, well-defined categories, courts would
250
consider several factors, most of them functional considerations. And
instead .o f deferring on a particular issue in the case, courts would abstain
25
from reviewing the government's actions altogether. J The courts still
abstain under the political question doctrine relatively frequently in foreign
252
affairs cases . But courts have been all over the map, treating similar cases
253
differently, resulting in ''jurisprudential chaos.''
The Supreme Court continued to deploy special deference through the
end of the Cold War and beyond. In Dames & Moore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion frankly acknowledged the irresolvable dilemma caused
by the realist roots of special deference "the never-ending tension between
the President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents
each day some new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution
at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less to
contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-Chief. I should indulge the widest
latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of
national force, at least when turned against the outside world for security of our society. But,
when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle
between industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence."). Invoking the distinction
between foreign and domestic realms enabled Jackson,-like Sutherland before him, to confirm
the existence of very broad executive power in foreign affairs while enforcing limitations on
executive power in the domestic context For a discussion of Youngstown as reinforcing the
realist paradigm; see Gott, supra note 213, at 199-201. At the same time, Jackson's influential
approach also enhanced the importance of functionalism in foreign affairs jurisprudence. See
Stephen Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Functionalism in Youngstown's Shadow, 53 Sr. LOUIS U. L.l.
29, 31 (2008) ("[I]n Youngstown's shadow, there is exceedingly little room for foreign affairs
originalism in any fonn. ").
248. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)~ In Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v~
Avagliano, the Court went further, suggesting that ambiguity was not a prerequisite for applying
''great weight" deference in treaty interpretation. 457 U~S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
249. 369 u.s. 186, 209-23 (1962).
250. See id.
251. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, Formalism, supra
note 193, at 1402.
252. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 562 (3d Cir. 2006); Bancoult v. McNamara,
445 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194-95 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co.,-KG, 431 F.3d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2005); lgartuaDe La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005).
253. FRANCK, supra note l, at 8; see also Nzelibe, supra note 1,: at 941, 943; Goldsmith.,
Formalism, supra note 193, at 1399-1403.
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under which we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of
254
system of checks and balances." The requirements of realpolitik seem to
255
be fundamentally at odds with the ordinary operation of the Constitution.
The Second Circuit articulated this idea near the end of the Cold War: "[i]t
is evident that in today's topsy-turvy world governments can topple and
relationships can change in a moment. The Executive Branch must therefore
have broad, unfettered discretion in matters involving such sensitive, fast256
changing, and complex foreign relationships. "
The courts largely accepted the idea that the anarchic nature of the world
requires the President to do what is necessary to protect the nation's
interests, including exercising authority that the law does not appear to
grant him. But when the President asserts that lives are at risk if the Court
fails to uphold executive branch policies, how can the courts preserve a
place for separation-of-powers concerns in the balance?
Ill. THE FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIAL DEFERENCE
'

This section explains the connection between the traditional functional
justifications for special deference and particular aspects of international
relations realism. These justifications engender a number of problems,
257
many of which have already been addressed by other scholars. But the
realist bases create problems of their own, on which I focus here. In
particular, drawing a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign
relations issues creates boundary problems: in today's interconnected world,
domestic issues increasingly take on foreign affairs aspects. Moreover,
using anarchy as a basis for deference seems to require total deference and
does not, without more, explain the degree to which other separation-ofpowers purposes such as protecting individual rights and accountabilityshould be balanced against the effectiveness demands of anarchy and
realpolitik.

254. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,662 (1981).
25 5. Paul, supra note 197, at 763.
256. Nat,'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554-56 (2d Cir.
1988) (relying on a U.S. government amicus brief requesting that Iran be allowed access to U.S.
courts and permitting an Iranian lawsuit against a Liberian oil tanker to proceed, despite the fact
that the U.S. did not recognize the government of Iran).
25.7. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1231-35 (2007); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 946-47; see generally Jonathan
I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1989). ·
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A. Anarchy
A common justification for deference is that the President possesses
superior competence due to expertise, information gathering, and political
savvy in foreign affairs. These conclusions flow from the realist tenet that
the external context is fundamentally distinct from the domestic context.
The domestic realm is hierarchical and legal; the outside world is anarchical
and political. The international realm is thus far more complex and fluid
than the domestic realm. The executive is a political branch, popularly258
elected and far more attuned to politics than are the courts. Judges are, for
the most part, generalists who possess no special expertise in foreign
259
affairs. Courts can only receive the information presented to them and
260
cannot look beyond the record. The President has a vast foreign relations
bureaucracy to obtain and process information from around the world.
Executive agencies such as the State Department and the military better
understand the nature of foreign countries their institutions and culture~
261
and can predict responses in ways that courts cannot.
In the context of the political question doctrine, this rationale often
appears when courts conclude that an issue lacks 'judicially discoverable
262
and manageable standards." A stronger, related rationale is that the
political branches are better suited for tracking dynamic and evolving nonns
263
in the anarchic international environment. The meaning of international
law changes over time and nations do not agree today on its meaning.
Moreover, the relationships among nations in many instances will be
264
governed by informal nonns that do not correspond to intemationallaw.
In addition, many foreign affairs provisions in the Constitution had fixed
meanings under international law in the Eighteenth Century what it
meant, for example, to "declare war" or to issue "letters of marquee and

258. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86566 (1984) (stating that the Chief Executive is '~directly accountable to the people").
259. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(balancing the vital national interests of the United States and foreign countries is inappropriate
because ''the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic
and social policies of a foreign country").
260. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 200-01.
261. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204 -05.
262. Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Schneider v. Kissinger,
412 F.3d 190, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
263. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 979.
264. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1205, 1226.
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reprisal" but subsequent practice has substantially altered their meaning or
265
rendered them irrelevant. Courts are not adept at tracking these shifts.
As many critics have observed, the "lack of judicially-manageable
standards" argument is weak. Courts create rules to govern disputes
266
regarding vague constitutional provisions such as the Due Process Clause.
Furthermore, if courts were to adjudicate foreign affairs disputes more
often, they would have the opportunity to create clearer standards, making
267
them more manageable. Thus the lack-of-standards argument does not
alone explain why foreign affairs should be off-limits.
The argument regarding courts' limited access to information and lack of
expertise seem persuasive at first, but it loses its force upon deeper
inspection. For instance, expertise is also a rationale for Chevron deference
268
in the domestic context. Generalist judges handle cases involving highly
complex and obscure non-foreign affairs issues while giving appropriate
deference to interpretations of agencies charged with administering
269
statutory schemes. What makes foreign affairs issues so different that
270
they justify even greater deference? Perhaps foreign affairs issues are just
an order of magnitude more complex than even the most complex domestic
issues. However, this line of thinking very quickly leads to boundary
problems. Economic globalization, rapid global information flow, and
incre.ased transborder movement have "radically increased the number of
cases that directly implicate foreign relations" and have made foreign
parties and conduct, as well as international law questions, increasingly

265. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 979; David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 13
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791, 1859-60, 1860 n.209, 1874 (1998) (referring to the "now obsolete power
to grant letters of marquee and reprisal").
266. See FRANCK, supra note 1, at 48-50; KoH, supra note 37, at 224; Nzelibe, supra note
1, at 978-81; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question'', 79 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1031, 1046-48 ( 1985).
267. Spiro, supra note 12, at 676-77 ("The argument that there are no applicable legal
standards by which to determine a rule of decision is, first of all, alternatively circular or selffulfilling. The sorts of issues posed by foreign relations law are not as a matter of legal
interpretation inherently different from other questions of law.").
268. See Chevron U.S~A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
269. See Charney, supra note 257, at 809 (observing that "[t]he role of the judiciary in
[foreign affairs] cases does not differ from that played in other cases it routinely decides. The
courts are provided with the necessary information by attorneys acting in their roles as
advocates
. In purely domestic cases, novel and highly complex technical issues are
regularly and successfully addressed"); see also Spiro, supra note 12, at 678-79.
270. See Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 663-67 (observing that domestic; and foreign
relations matters are increasingly intertwined, undermining the expertise argument).
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common in U.S. litigation. If courts were to cabin off all matters touching
on foreign relations as beyond their expertise, it would result in an everincreasing abdication of their role.
The political norm-tracking argument reveals the second major problem
with using anarchy as a basis for special deference: it fails to account for the
degree of deference that should be afforded to the President. Under the
anarchy-based argument, the meaning of treaties and other concepts in
foreign affairs depend entirely on politics and power dynamics, which the
President is especially competent (and the courts especially incompetent) in
tracking. If this is so, the courts must give total deference to the executive
branch. If one does not wish to take the position that the courts should butt
out altogether in foreign affairs, there must be other reasons for the courts'
involvement. Even proponents of special deference generally acknowledge
that some of the courts) strengths lie in protecting individual rights and
272
"democracy-forcing." But what is the correct balance to strike between
competing functional goals of the separation of powers?
B. Unitary States

Other functional justifications derive from the realist tenet that the world
system is populated solely by unitary states. These arguments for special
deference are the least persuasive. Most importantly, they do not correspond
to actual practice. But they are, at bottom, another way of articulating the
more compelling realpolitik arguments.
1.

Uniformity

A common trope in the cases is that the nation "speaks with one voice"
273
in foreign relations. With respect to the outside world, the United States is
a singular, opaque entity. The one-voice phrase comes from Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in United States v. Pink, a decision containing
274
sweeping language about the limits of the states' role in foreign relations.
271. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1236; see also Goldsmith, Formalism, supra
note 193, at 1397.
272. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1001; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between

Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights
During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that courts, by focusing
on congressional endorsement of emergency measures, create "broad-based political
accountability for the actions taken [by the executive] in the name of national security").
273. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
274. See id. at 242 ("In our dealings with the outside world, the United States speaks with
one voice and acts as one ... .");see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937)
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But the one-voice rationale has also been adopted in support of the
275
executive-centered framework.
The one-voice rationale is in a sense not functionalist at all, but a formal
essentialist assertion about the scope of the Constitution's allocation of
powers. To the extent that it is functional, it must rest entirely on other
rationales. A potential rationale is as follows: because the President is the
276
only unitary, centralized branch of govenunent, only the President can
truly speak with one voice and is therefore the only branch that can suitably
represent a unitary entity in the international arena.
But as has been frequently observed, the United States has never strictly
277
spoken "with one voice'' in foreign affairs. The Constitution's text
278
allocates foreign affairs powers to both the Congress and the President. In
practice, Congress has from time to time disagreed with the President, even
279
regarding highly sensitive national security matters. And the courts have,
from the very beginning, rejected executive branch interpretations of
280
treaties.
Although the separation of powers has been criticized as
interfering with the ability of the United States to form a unified foreign
281
policy, this is the government that the Constitution created. The one-voice
argument simply does not hold up to scrutiny, at least in its strong form. But
there are other rationales for a weaker form· embarrassment and
accountability~

("[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of
that government."); Spiro, supra note 12, at 681 ("It is the fact and features of the exogenous
context that have dictated that the nation ·speak with one voice' when it comes to foreign
relations ... and that that voice not be the judiciary~s.").
275. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2226 (2008) ("The Judiciary is not suited to secondguess determinations . . . that would require federal courts to . . . undennine the Government's
ability to speak with one voice in this area.").
276. Although Congress and the courts are capable of speaking with one voice, only the
President does so consistently. See, e.g., U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
( 1936) ("[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.").
277. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the 'One Voice' Myth in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REv. 975, 975-76 (2001).
278. Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 656.
279. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 965-66 (discussing examples).
280. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 787-93.
281. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 128 (1980)
(noting that a shortcoming of the constitutional structure of the United States is the inability to
~'form a government").
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Embarrassment

A related argument, and a justification for the one-voice rationale, is that
the United States will be "embarrassed" by conflicting pronouncements
from different branches of government. The risk of embarrassment plays a
key role in the Curtiss- Wright homily on superior executive competence,
and has been frequently mentioned in foreign affairs political question
282
decisions since Baker v. Carr.
The core of the embarrassment justification is, possibly, that U.S.
diplomats will be undertnined in their delicate negotiations with other
nations because court decisions that conflict with executive branch policy
283
could baffle or even offend foreign officials. But it is difficult to argue
that foreign dignitaries will fail to understand how the branches of the U.S.
government can reach different interpretations of the law. America's current
structure of government has existed for almost 230 years. In the past, "other
nations [were] asked to understand our complex constitutional system of
284
checks and balances and we somehow managed to survive as a nation. "
Other justifications that have been labeled as "embarrassment" are more
compelling, however. Court proceedings could increase the risk of revealing
sensitive information. Perhaps more importantly, judicial decisions could
have unforeseen consequences that undermine U.S. interests, make the U.S.
appear weak, and ultimately disrupt the delicate balance of power in
international relations. This aspect is related to realpolitik, which I address
in the next subpart.
3.

Accountability

If nations are viewed as unitary entities in the international arena, there
must be one governmental entity that can be held accountable for a nation s
actions in foreign affairs, and for the U.S., that can only be the executive
branch. Through this executive-exclusive lens, the American public and
foreign governments either do not know how to, or simply cannot, hold the
7

282. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 189, 217 (1962); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 ( 1936); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1203,
1207 (9th Cir. 2007); Gross v. Gertnan Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir.
2006); lgartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005); Wang v.
Masaitis, 416 F .3d 992, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2005).
283. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,588 (1943) ("[C]ourts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction ... as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations."); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that judicial invalidation of the North American Free Trade Agreement would
embarrass the President); see Spiro, supra note 12, at 678-82.
284. Redish, supra note 266, at 1052.
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courts accountable for their foreign affairs decisions. Holding courts
286
accountable is relatively difficult because the transaction costs are high.
While the President is one officer elected every four years, the federal
judiciary comprises hundreds of individuals possessing lifetime tenure, and
who can only be formally held accountable through impeachment.
Deferentialists also argue that the public associates the executive branch
with national security and foreign affairs, but associates the courts with
protecting minority rights and resolving controversies among domestic
287
parties.
The accountability justification generally overstates the degree to which
288
courts are insulated from politics. On the domestic front, Supreme Court
appointments have become an increasingly prominent issue in presidential
elections, at least since Roe v. Wade and the nominations of Robert Bork
289
and Clarence Thomas. Although foreign affairs have not played much of
a role in these debates thus far, this is almost certainly due to the courts'
generally deferential approach to foreign relations controversies. When the
courts have been bolder, SllCh as in the enemy combatant cases, they have
c-aptured the attention of policy-makers and the public, creating issues for
290
presidential campaigns. Moreover, accountability cuts both ways. It is a
291
core purpose of the separation of powers. The courts can serve an
important information-forcing role that assists the People in holding the
executive branch accountable for foreign affairs decisions, many of which
292
are shrouded in secrecy. Court cases require the government to clearly
285. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at, 1213.
286. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress's Power to Block Enforcement of Federal
Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1348-49 (2008).
287. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 962.
288. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 26769 (2005) (observing that scholars have recently ubegun to see that constitutional judging
cannot be insulated from ~~ordinary, politics in quite the way theory demands").
289. See generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007); BENJAMIN
WriTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 6 (2006).
290. Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain, at a town hall meeting in
Pemberton, New Jersey, called the decision in Boumediene ~~one of the worst decisions in th.e
history
of
this
country."
Swampland,
http://www.timeblog.com/swampland/2008/06/mccain_slams_the_supreme_court.html (June 13, 2008, 11 :31
EST).
291. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
292. Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold
War World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 547, 572-73 (2007) (observing that independent
assessments of intelligence faih~.res "strongly suggest that limiting cooperation, consultation,
and engagement among agencies and between the branches can compromise, rather than
enhance, security efforts in areas where intelligence collection and analysis are key").
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articulate the rationales for its policies and the procedures through which
those policies were enacted. Habeas corpus forces federal officers to justify
their detention of individuals whose imprisonment would otherwise remain
293
unscrutinized.
In any event, assuming that the courts are relatively less accountable than
the politic.al branches, this aspect ·o f the constitutional regime is accepted in
the domestic context. Why should foreign affairs require faster and easier
accountability? Ultimately, the one-voice arguments for special deference:for uniformity, accountability, and avoiding embarrassment must be
grounded in assumptions about the peculiar requirements of managing a
great power's foreign policy in an anarchic world. These are considerations
of realpolitik, which I discuss in the next subpart.
.

.

C. Realpolitik
Among the most compelling functional arguments for special deference
are normative considerations deriving from realpolitik. These arguments
evoke common impressions about the conduct of foreign .Policy that it is
conducted in secret; that it requires rapid responses to changing conditions,
and that it involves delicate negotiations between a few elites representing
the interests of the great powers who were willing to violate norms in order
to achieve their foreign policy ends. These qualities are believed to be
necessary to further the realist goals of' protecting the security of the state
and maintaining a stable balance of power in a multipolar or bipolar
294
international system.
1.

Flexibility

Because the world is inherently anarchic and thus unstable, flexibility is
crucial.. Because the meaning of international law c_hanges with subtly
shifting power dynamics, the United States must be capable of quickly
altering its interpretation of laws in order to preserve its advantage and
295
296
avoid war if possible. Like Machiavelli's Prince, the U.S. government
293. See John Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas Corpus as Information-Forcing Device
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
294. See supra Part II.,A.
295. See., e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 980 (''In the context of foreign affairs . ., an
authoritative settlement of the law across time and institutions
potentially results in the
creation of a constitutional straight-Jacket binding the decision-making freedom of the political
branches in the international arena.")~
296. See MACHIAVELLI~ supra note 177, at 59-60.
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must be willing and able to bend with the shifting political winds and
297
transgress norms ifnecessary.
On this terrain, the executive branch appears to have clear advantages
over the courts. The executive branch is more capable of altering its
interpretation of the law when it suits U.S. interests. The courts must work
298
within the confines of doctrine and stare decisis. Courts cannot weigh in
on the vast majority of foreign affairs issues because they only hear the
controversies that parties bring before them, and have only the power to
299
adjudicate the issues raised. In short, courts' status as legal, rather than
political, institutions limits their flexibility.
Again, however, the anarchy-based argument for flexibility boils down
to an argument for total discretion. How do the courts determine when and
how much to cabin executive power? Jide Nzelibe has concluded that in
cases involving individual rights, the courts should take into account their
competence in adjudicating such issues while balancing the individual
rights concerns against the need to defer to the executive branch's foreign
300
policy requirements. But if the courts lack competence to evaluate the
importance of a foreign policy need, how can they competently weigh that
need against the importance of protecting individual rights?
2.

Speed

Since Curtiss- Wright, speed has been recognized as an important
executive branch characteristic. The executive branch can reach a unifonn
interpretation of the law quickly, and the courts are, by comparison, quite
301
slow. This is understandable in a world in which subtly-shifting alliances
detennine the balance of power. And in the age of terrorism, speed remains
a crucial component of effective foreign policy. The ace card for defenders
of special deference remains the national security emergency. How can we

297. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN
EXECUTIVE POWER xix (1989) (offering an interpretation of the executive branch as a tamed
version of Machiavelli's Prince, and concluding that the Constitution "would not work without
a branch whose function could be accurately described . as getting around the constitution
when necessary").
298. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 220.
299. /d. at 5 ("The courts consider only cases, cases require proper parties and proper
issues, and foreign affairs do not ordinarily provide them to the courts' satisfaction.").
300. Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 946.
301. See Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40, at 188 (arguing that the institutional
structure of the federal judiciary ninety-four district courts and thirteen appellate courtsinherently makes the judicial process slow).
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possibly take the risk that the courts will hobble the President's efforts to
302
protect the United States in a time of crisis?
It is important to separate the very slender category of true emergencies
fro.m the vast category of foreign relations in general. The great majority of
foreign affairs controversies do not involve the President sending troops
abroad or·a threatened terrorist attack, and there is very little opportunity for
courts to interfere with an executive· response to a crisis situation. Courts
303
typically review the legality of presidential decisions years later. Most of
the "enemy combatants" detained at Guantanamo were captured within a
few months of September 11, 2001, and arrived at GuantRnamo in early
304
2002. The Supreme Court did not address the detainees' constitutional
305
right to habeas review until 2008.
The difficulty lies in situations where the courts are asked to use their
equitable powers and issue injunctions or TROs before the issues have been
fully adjudicated. Here it is the courts' institutional deliberativeness that is,
306
arguably, the problem.
3.

Secrecy

Since Curtiss- Wright, secrecy has also been invoked as a rationale for
307
Again, this evokes a
deference to the executive in foreign affairs.
multipolar world in which diplomacy is conducted in private by an elite
cadre from the great powers. However, courts are capable of handling
308
secrets even more skillfully than Congress. The secrecy argument is
really an argument about the potential consequences of revealing secrets to
non-governmental parties and the collateral consequences that would result.

302. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 42, at 272 ('~To be able to respond to international
crises, the President cannot be hemmed in by international treaties and Constitutional
limitations, as interpreted by judges."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
303. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1256.
304. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 63-84
(2006).
305. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2229 (2008).
306. See Ku & Yoo, Formalism, supra note 40, at 186-87.
307. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 (1982) ("[T]he conduct of foreign affairs [is]
a realm in which the Court has recognized that it would be intolerable that courts, without the
relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
inforrnation properly held secret") (internal quotation marks omitte.d); United States v. Curtiss..
Wright Exp~ Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936).
308. See Pearlstein, supra note 28; Kenneth N. Roth, After Guantanamo: The Case Against
Preventive Detention, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 16 (2008).
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Collateral Consequences

Many of the rationales for special deference ·expertise, embarrassment,
unifonnity, and secrecy have, at their core, the assumption that the courts'
involvement in foreign affairs will risk serious collateral consequences in
international relations that courts cannot anticipate,. cannot fully understand,
309
and do not have the power to adequately address. There are collateral
consequences for court decisions in the domestic context as well~ .But the
distinction drawn in foreign affairs .reflects the tragic side of realism that
the world is inherently an unstable and dangerous place, an arena for
clashes between great powers under constant threat of war. In an
international system in which the balance of power is precarious and
preserved only through delicate maneuvering by statesmen, the courts'
involvement could risk provoking another great power and undennining
these efforts.
But once again, this justification, taken to its logical conclusion, requires
complete deference. If. courts truly lack any sense of the collateral
consequences of their foreign affairs decisions, they cannot competently
weigh those consequences against competing constitutional values. Suppose
that the U ..S. government advances a novel interpretation of criminal
statutes in order to prosecute a suspected terrorist whose release, the
government insists, would create instability in a key U.S. ally in the Middle
East. Under the collateral consequences justification, the court must always
defer to the government's interpretation . This would eviscerate entirely the
courts' statutory interpretation role whenever there is a claimed foreign
affairs exigency.
5.

Legitimacy

Arguments for the courts' incompetence in foreign affairs also focus on
legitimacy. Courts are said to lack legitimacy in this area because their
ordinary power to bestow legitimacy on the other branches in the domestic
context cannot function properly in the entirely political external realm. The
political branches do not require the courts' blessing for their activities
31
outside the U.S. ° Furthermore, the courts seem to face a dilemma: If they
contravene the executive branch, the public will view this involvement with
309. See Crosby v. Nat' I Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, J86 (2000) (''We have,;after
all, not only recognized the limits of our own capacity to ~determin[e] precisely when foreign
nations will be offended by particular acts,' but consistently acknowledged that the 'nuances' of
'the foreign policy of the United States ... are.much more the province of the Executive Branch
and Congress than of this Court ....")(internal citations omitted).
31 0. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952.
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hostility, especially when national security is at stake. But if the courts
side with the President, they risk being seen as mere cogs in the
312
government's foreign policy apparatus.
However, some deferentialists acknowledge that courts should adjudicate
foreign affairs cases involving individual rights claims but balance the right
313
in question against the government's asserted foreign policy needs. The
difficulty with this approach is that, under the anarchy/realpolitik
worldview, the government's arguments must always tiump. If the courts
are not competent to evaluate the importance of foreign policy necessity,
then how can they weigh it against the value of individual rights? Similarly,
if the courts lack legitimacy to evaluate foreign policy needs, their decisions
will be perceived as lacking legitimacy whether individual rights are
involved or not. Professors Ku and Yoo do not make a similar concession,
at least with respect to non-citizens. They have concluded that, while the
public may tolerate limited intervention to protect constitutional liberties in
wartime, the public has no patience for the courts' interfering with
executive prerogatives to reinforce the rights of aliens designated as
314
enemies. B-ut in any event, the realist model seems to leave little room for
the consideration of individual liberties, even for citizens.
IV. THE HEGEMONIC MODEL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE
Today's world is far different from the unstable, multipolar world of the
1930s that provided the geopolitical context for Curtiss-Wright or the
bipolar Cold War era in which the special deference doctrines were
developed. This Section describes the post-Cold War international system
and introduces the hegemonic model. It then discusses the enemy combatant
cases as an application of that model.
A. The American-Led International System

Much of contemporary realist theory is concerned with the balance of
power. Stability in an anarchic system is created by great powers, which
form "poles" in the system. During the Cold War, the respective
hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States maintained a balance

311. See id.
312. John C. Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the HelmsBurton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 768 (1997).
313. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952.
314. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186.
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But since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has

lacked balancing rivals and is the only nation capable of projecting military
power anywhere in the world. The United States today is frequently referred
316
to as an empire by scholars from across the political spectrum. There is a
vast literature on the United States as empire, but the aftermath of 9/11, the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the Bush Administration foreign policy
317
.have spurred new interest in imperial theories.
Empire and imperialism are loaded terms, to say the least, and their use
318
is just as often normative as descriptive. In a useful attempt to clear up
confusion concerning definitions of empire,. Daniel A. Nexon and Thomas
Wright have identified three frameworks for describing systems with
319
preeminent powers: unipolarity, hegemony, and empire.
Today's
international system does not conform precisely to any of these three idealtypical structures, but they are useful for better aligning the institutional
competences model with changes in the world.
Unipolar orders have- few ties, with a single state dominating in an
320
anarchical system.
These types of orders remain stable when the
preeminent state cannot be challenged militarily because it has
overwhelming_ capabilities or collective action problems prevent other
321
nations from forming counter-balancing blocs.
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity
was thought to be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to
protect their own security, form alliances to counter-balance the leading
322
state. But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge
323
America's military predominance. Although some realists predict that

315. See Waltz, Reductionist, supra note 169, at 47~
316. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253 (observing that scholars on both the left and
right describe the U.S. as an empire); JosephS. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 82
FOREIGN AFF. 60, 60 (2005) (same).
317. See, e~g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
(2004); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2004).
318. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253.
319. See id. at256-57.
320. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 24-25
(1989).
321. See William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 INT'L SECURITY 5,
5-6 (1999).
322. See, e.g., IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 104 (observing that, under
traditional structural realist balance of power theory, "American preponderance is
unsustainable" because ''it poses a danger to other states and balancing reactions are

inevitable"); Waltz, Anarchic Orders, supra note 159, at 117.
323. Craig, supra note 9, at 144~
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counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring,
William Wohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true
counter-balancing; in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen
325
for decades.
326
American unipolarity is unprecedented. First, the United States is
geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one
327
another in Eurasia. This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to
pose while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one
328
another. Second, the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in
every aspect of power military, economic, technological, and in terms of
what is known as "soft power.'' This advantage "is larger now than any
329
analogous gap in the history of the modem state system. "
Third,
unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first time since the
seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and
330
rendering less relevant all modem previous experience with balancing.
Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the
concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war
311
between great powers in today's world is very unlikely.
These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and
durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United
States operated for all of its history until 1991. The lack of balancing means
that the United States, and by extension the executive branch, faces much
332
weaker external constraints on its exercise of power than in the past.
Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any
333
other nations' have in history. And it is these internal processes, as much
as external developments, that will determine the durability of American
unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the
324. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 392 (200 1)
(arguing that regional hegemons will arise to challenge American dominance).
325. Wohlfarth, supra note 321, at 8.

326. !d. at 38.
327. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE
POST-AMERICAN WORLD 21 (2008) (hereinafter ZAKARIA, AMERICAN].
328. Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlfarth, International Relations Theory and the
Case Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON ·p oL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks &
Wohlforth, Unilateralism].
329. /d.
330. /d.
331. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlfarth, Hard Times for So.ft Balancing, 30 INT'L
SECURITY 72, 106 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlfarth, Hard Times].
332. Abebe, supra note 12; Brooks & Wohlfarth, Hard Times, supra note 331, at 108
("[O]ther states are simply not going to force the United States to act in a more restrained
manner by acting in a systematic, co!'"ordinated manner to check U.S. power.").
333. Wohlfarth, supra note 321, at 40.
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stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears
334
legitimate.
Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the
preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a
335
Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part
unipolar order.
through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic
336
For example, if Nation X's security is
specialization among nations.
supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and
focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, the preeminent state has
"the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own
337
interests." The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system
338
The hegemon possesses not only superior command of
as a whole.
military and economic resources but "soft" power, the ability to guide other
339
The durability and stability of
states' preferences and interests.
hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's
340
role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate.

334. Stephen Walt, Keeping the World Off-Balance, in AMERICA UNRlVALED: THE FUTURE
OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 121, 150 (G. John Ikenberry ed., 2002).
335. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 253.
336. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE
REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 10 (2001); Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 257.
337. Michael Mastanduno, Hegemonic Order, 9/11, and the Bush Revolution, 5 INT'L REL.
OF THE ASIA-PAC. 177, 179 (2005); see also Michael Mastanduno, Incomplete Hegemony and
Security Order in the Asia-Pacific, in AMERICA UNRIVALED: THE FUTURE OF THE BALANCE OF
POWER, supra note 334, at 187 ("The hegemonic state should be pivotal in setting the rules of

the game, even if it does not prevail in every particular conflict."). For a classic study of
hegemony, see ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1987).
338. Public goods are "nonrivalrous"

capable of being simultaneously consumed by the
provider and others and "nonexcludable" impossible to keep others from consuming. John
0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REv.
1175, I 236 (2007).
339. Martin Griffiths, Beyond the Bush Doctrine: American Hegemony and World Order,
23 AUSTRALASIAN J. AM. STUD. 63, 63 (2004). The term "soft power" was coined by Joseph
Nye. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS x
(2004) (explaining that soft power "is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather

than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country.,s culture, political
ideals, and policies.").
340. Bruce Cumings, The United States: Hegemonic Still?, in THE INTERREGNUM:
CONTROVERSIES IN WORLD POLITICS 1989-1999, at 285-86 (1999) ("[H]egemony is most
effective when it is indirect, inclusive, plural, heterogeneous, and consensual less a fortn of
domination than a form of legitimate global leadership."); Randall Schweller & David Priess, A
Tale ofTu'o Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate, 41 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 1, 24
( 1997) f'~lf the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on
legitimate influence and management, lesser states will bandwagon with rather than balance

142

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the
341
U~S. acts as a world govermnent. It provides public goods for the world,

such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for
342
open markets. After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military
alliances and transnational economic and political institutions such as the
United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Bank that remain in place today. The U,.S. provides security for allies such
as Japan and Gennany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia
343
and Europe. Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S.
344
possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly,; on the use of force. T.his
prevents other nations from launching, wars that would tend to be truly
destabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through
its efforts to combat terrorism and confront even through regime
345
change- rogue states.
The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation
and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence
on the definition of international law because it is the largest ''consumer" of
346
such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale.
The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United
Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and
institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private
347
international law.,
Moreover, controlling international norms are
against it."). For the origins of this concept, see ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS ( 1985).
341. MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 164 (referring to "the American role as the-world's
government").
342. See id. at 34-62 (describing the public goods provided by the United States for the
world).
343. ld.
344 Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 618 ("The United States possesses a quasimonopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and behaviors of
states are increasingly open to global that is, American scrutiny.")
345. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 163 (observing that forceful U.S. measures
to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted .Europe and China to adopt
more conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL
COLLECTIVE ACTION 144-61 (2004) (applying public goods theory to the control of rogue
states).
346. See McGinnis and Somin, supra note 338, at 1241~2.
347. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210,
1227-29 (2005) (noting that "the, United States has historically been a major proponent and
progenitor of international law norms'' and discussing U.S. influence over international
economic law); Sarah Cleveland; Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 102
(2006) (observing that "The United States was the ·primary instigator behind the establishment
of the UN system and the creation of modem international treaties ranging from human rights
and humanitarian law to international intellectual property and international trade.'').
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sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than
in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist
threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law
regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under
which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment
348
of enemy combatants. "
These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by
legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and
economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries
with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to
American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S.
349
rather than seek to create alternative centers of power.
American
hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization the increasing
integration and standardization of markets and cultures which tends to
350
stabilize the global system and reduce conflict.
The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by
the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American
constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk
that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or
decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides
351
in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the govemment.
Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies
in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign
352
policy is made. They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an
353
effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. Because the United
States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific
interest in the fates of particular countries and fortn ''ethnic lobbies" for the
354
purpose of affecting foreign policy. The courts, too, are accessible to
foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an

348. See McGinnis and Somin, supra note 338, at 1242.
349. See, e.g., Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 613.
350. See id. at 615-16.
351. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 164-65.
352. The post-Cold War era has seen an acceleration in the trend that began in the mid. .
1970s, away from foreign policy conducted by an elite group within the executive branch
toward one involving a much broader community. See John T. Tierney, Interest Group
Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT 89, 95-98
(Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993).
353. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 165.
354. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 338, at 1245.
.
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important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S.
355
courts.
Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires
consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core the
356
preeminent state ruling the periphery through intermediaries. The core
institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains
357
(heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. Ties among
peripheries (the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of
358
resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other. The
359
success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim." Stability
in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the
formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting
360
differences among potential challengers.
Divide-and-rule strategies
include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in
another part and multi-vocal communication legitimating imperial rule by
361
signaling "different identities ... to different audiences. "
Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies
only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations
362
scholars question the comparison.
However, the U.S. does exercise
informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the
foreign policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military,
363
economic, or political support'' if they refuse to comply. The "Status of
Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities
of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world
364
are typically one-sided. And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan
had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on
365
American support.
355. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 51 DUKE L.J.
891, 954-55 (2008).
356. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 258.
357. See id. at 259; Charles Tilly, How Empires End, in AFTER EMPIRE: MULTIETHNIC
SOCIETIES AND NATION-BUILDING 1, 3 (K. Barkey & M. von Hagen eds., 1997).
358. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 261-62 .
359. /d. at 261-65.
360. /d. at 261--62.
361. /d. at 264.
362. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 339, at 135-36.
363. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 266.
364. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base
Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. I, 6 (2006) (uWith great consistency, the
United States has ... leveraged its international power to obtain base agreements that heavily
favor U.S. interests over those of receiving states.").
365. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 266-67.
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But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of
globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend
to fail when peripheries can comn1unicate with one another. The U.S. is less
able control "the flow of information . . . about its bargains and activities
366
around the world." In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force
Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense media
367
Another
scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign.
classic imperial tactic the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate
resistance to imperial rule is also unlikely to be effective today. The
success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of
ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists, through the
Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their
368
The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's
cause."
369
"brand'' and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. Imperial rule, like
hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy.

B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model
International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current
era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some
instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from traditional realist
assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more
hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique
functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to
foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on
successful functioning of the U.S. govermnent as a whole than it does on
balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik.
"[W]orld power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure created by
370
interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington. "
These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional
competences of the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs.

366. /d. at 268.
367. See Charles Babington, Iraq Deal Hovers over Presidential Campaign, USA TODAY,
Aug.
22, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-08-223316922096- x.htm.
368. Colin H. Kahl, Coin of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counter-insurgency?, 86
FOREIGN AFF. 169, 173 (2007) (discussing the 2007 U.S. Artny/Marine Corps CounterInsurgency Manual).
369. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR'S CAPE: AMERICA'S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO
TERROR 152-53 (2007).
370. Craig, supra note 9, at 169.
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One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using
insights from a major alternative theory of international relations,liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of
states in particular, the form of government dictate states' behavior, and
371
that democracies do not go to war against one another. Liberalists also
regard economic interdependence and international institutions as important
372
for maintaining peace and stability in the world. Dean Anne-Marie
Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal,
373
democratic states and non-democratic states.
Because domestic and
foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter
reasons, the courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the
374
political branches' powers. With respect to non-liberal states, the position
of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of
375
deference.
One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the
uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has observed
that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which
376
countries are liberal democracies. But even if courts are capable of
making these determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas
adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the
appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and domestic matters? How
much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights
and accountability values are at stake?
To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be
applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a
new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional justifications for
special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of
role effectiveness which allocation of power among the branches will best
achieve general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twentyfirst century, America's global role has changed, and the best means of
achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The
international realm remains highly political if not as much as in the pastbut it is American politics that matters most. If the U.S. is truly an empire:371. See JOHN M.

IV, LIBERAL PEACE, LIBERAL WAR: AMERICAN POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 3-4 (1997); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE 3, 10 (Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones &
Steven E. Miller eds., 1996).
372. See, e.g., EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, POWER, TRADE, AND WAR 122 (1994).
373. Slaughter Burley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 2002.
374. !d. at 2002.
375. /d. at 2002-03.
376. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 974.
OWEN
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and in some respects it is

the problems of imperial management will be
far different from the problems of managing relations with one other great
power or many great powers. Similarly, the management of hegemony or
unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American
predominance is recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus _among
377
realists about the precise nature of the current international order, The
hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR
frameworks unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial ·described above.
First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S.
foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is
more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and
prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from.
its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its
378
place. The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major
379
war. In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the
public goods it had formerly produc.ed; as the largest consumer, it would
suffer the most.
Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is
380
unusually stable and durable. . As noted above, other nations have many
381
incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. And although other
nations or groups of nations China, the European Union, and India are
often mentioned may eventually overtake the United States in certain
areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S . will remain dominant in most
measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S.
382
economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. The U.S.
accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds
enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be
383
competitors. Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have
384
thus far proved premature.

377. See Craig, supra note 9, at 169.
378. See JosephS. Nye, Jr., The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 78
INT'L AFF. 233, 239--40 (2002) ("If the largest beneficiary of a public good (for example, the
United States) does not take the lead in directing disproportionate resources toward its
provision, the smaller beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to produce it, because of the
difficulties of organizing collective action when large numbers are involved.").
379. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 10, at 98-99.
380. See supra notes 349-350 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 335-340 and accompanying text.
382. ZAKARIA, AMERICAN, supra note 327, at 181.
383. ld. at 181-82.
384. ld. at 210-11.
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Third, the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American
385
hegemony depends not just on power, but legitimacy.
All three IR
frameworks for describing predominant states although unipolarity less
than hegemony or empire suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability
and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant states in
unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of
force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant
386
state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. Legitimacy as
a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient.
The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences
more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a
stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure,
and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional
constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts'
treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its
treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign
affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing
boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the
infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by
reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh
different
functional
considerations liberty,
accountability,
and
effectiveness against one another is made less intractable because it
becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in
adjudicating domestic disputes.
The domestic deference doctrines such as Chevron and Skidmore are
hardly models of clarity, but they are applied and discussed by the courts
much more often than foreign affairs deference doctrines, and can be
387
usefully applied to foreign affairs cases as well. The domestic deference
doctrines are a recognition that legal interpretation often depends on
388
politics, just as it does in the international realm.
Most of the same
functional
rationales expertise,
accountability,
flexibility,
and
uniformity that are advanced in support of exceptional foreign affairs
deference also undergird Chevron. Accordingly, Chevron deference
provides considerable latitude for the executive branch to change its
interpretation of the law to adjust to foreign policy requirements. Once
courts detertnine that a statute is ambiguous, the reasonableness threshold is
385. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
386. Recall that globalization is likely to thwart traditional methods of "divide-and-ruleh in
imperial structures. See Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 262, 268.
387. See generally Bradley, Chevron, supra note 1, at 653; Sullivan, supra note I.
388. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204-05.
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easy for the agency to meet; that is why Chevron is "strong medicine.'' At
the same time, Chevron's limited application ensures that agency
interpretations result from a full and fair process. Without such process, the
courts should look skeptically on altered interpretations of the law.
Returning to domestic ·d eferenc.e standards as a baseline clarifies the
ways in which foreign affairs are truly "special." The best response to the
special nature of foreign affairs matters does not lie simply in adopting
domestic deference on steroids. Instead, accurate analysis must also take
into account the ways in which the constitutional separation of powers
already .a ccommodates the uniqueness of foreign affairs. Many of the
differences between domestic and foreign affairs play out not in legal
doctrine; but in the relationship between the President and Congress. Under
the hegemonic model, courts would still wind up deferring to executive
branch interpretations much more often in foreign affairs matters because
Congress is more likely to delegate law-making to the executive branch in
390
those areas.
Nonetheless, foreign relations remain special, and courts must treat them
differently in one important respect. In the twenty-first cen
, speed
matters, and the executive branch alone possesses the ability to articulate
and implement foreign policy quickly. Even non-realists will acknowledge
that the international realm is much more susceptible to crisis and
emergency than the domestic realm. But speed remains more important
391
even to non-crisis foreign affairs cases. It is true that the stable nature of
American hegemony will prevent truly destabilizing events from happening
without great changes in the geopolitical situation the sort that occur over
decades. The United States will not, for some time, face the same sorts of
392
existential threats as in the past. Nonetheless, in foreign affairs matters, it
is only the executive branch that has the capacity successfully to conduct

389. Thomas Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 859 ("The
Chevron decision requires courts to accept any agency interpretation that is reasonable, even if
it is not the interpretation that the court finds most plausible.").
390. Examples include the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§
1701-06 (2006), and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-5 (1994).
See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (offering an influential framework in which the President's powers in foreign
affairs are highest when supported by congressional approval).
391. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1204.
392. See Fareed Zakaria, True or False: We Need a Wartime President, NEWSWEEK, July
14, 2008, at 48 (rejecting arguments that al Qaeda or Iran represent existential threats to the
United States). But see PHILIP BOBBIT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 202 (2006) (' An existential threat is precisely the sort of threat that terror
poses. ").
41

150

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

treaty negotiations, for example, which depend on adjusting positions
quickly.
The need for speed is particularly acute in crises. Threats from
transnational terrorist groups and loose nuclear weapons are among the
most serious problems facing the United States today. The United States
393

maintains a "quasi-monopoly on the international use of force," but the
rapid pace of change and improvements in weapons technology mean that
the executive branch must respond to emergencies long before the courts
have an opportunity to weigh in. Even if a court was able to respond quickly
enough, it is not clear that we would want courts to adjudicate foreign
affairs crises without the deliberation and opportunities for review that are
essential aspects of their institutional competence. Therefore, courts should
grant a higher level of deference to executive branch determinations in
deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction in foreign affairs matters. Under the super-strong Curtiss~ Wright
deference scheme, the court should accept the executive branch
interpretation unless Congress has specifically addressed the matter and the
issue does not fall within the President's textually-specified Article I
powers.

But there are limits. Although speed matters a ,great deal during crises, its
importance diminishes over time and other institutional competences
asst1me greater importance. When decisions made in response to
emergencies are cemented into policy over the course of years, the courts'
institutional
capabilities information-forcing
and
stabilizing
394
characteristics serve an important role in evaluating those policies.
Once a sufficient amount of time has passed, the amount of-deference given
to executive branch determinations should be reduced so that it matches
domestic deference standards.

One of the core realist arguments for deference, the risk of collateral
consequences, carries far less weight under a hegemonic model. Court
decisions have consequences for third parties in the domestic realm all of
the time, Given the hierarchical nature of U.S. hegemony, the response from
other nations is likely to be more similar to the response by domestic parties
than in the past. A typical example invoked by deferentialists involves a
court decision for example; recognizing the government of Taiwan that
395
angers the Chinese government. Although such a scenario is not out of
the question, there are several reasons why the consequences would not be
as dire as often predicted by deferentialists. American military dominance
393. Ikenberry, Liberalism,-supra note 6, at 618.
394. Pearlstein, supra note.28, at 61.
395. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1213 n.145.
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makes it highly unlikely that war would result from such an incident.
Moreover, China, too, cares about legitimacy and is far more likely to
retaliate in some other way, possibly harming the United States' interests,
but through means that would capture attention in the U.S. domestic realm,
leading to accountability .opportunities. Assuming that the decision is nonconstitutional, the Chinese government could seek to have its preferred
interpretation enacted into law.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that other nations would be content with
conflicting decisions from different branches of the U.S. government.
Suppose that the President roundly condemns the offensive court decision
and declares the judge to be an ~'activist." If the damage done by the court
decision was largely dignitary, an angry denouncement from the executive
branch may be all that is needed. Past empires relied on multi-vocal
397
signaling to maintain imperial rule. But with the advent of globalization,
intra-executive branch multi-vocality is much more difficult because
advances in communication permit various parts of the "rim" to
398
communicate with one another.
The American separation-of-powers
system provides a way around this problem, allowing the U.S. government
to "speak in different voices" at once.
C. Applying the Hegemonic Model: The Enemy Combatant Cases
In the wake of 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan and toppled
399
the Taliban government. Thousands of men; most captured by our allies
in Pakistan and Afghanistan (but also many other places around the world),
were transferred to U.S. custody and detained in a network of prisons
stretching from Afghanistan to Eastern Europe to Asia to Guantanamo Bay,
400
Cuba. The President made an executive determination that all detainees
held at Guantanamo were "enemy combatants," and that the law of armed
401
conflict specifically, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to them.
J96. See Wang Jisi, China's Search for Stability with America, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 39, 39-40
(2005) (noting that "for the next several years, Washington will not regard Beijing as its main
security threat, and China will avoid antagonizing the United States'').
397. Nexon & Wright, supra note 16, at 264.
398. See supra notes 366-69 and accompanying text.
399. See MARGULIES, supra note 304, at 3.
400. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. PosT,
Nov. 2, 2005, at At.
401. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Jan. 9, 2002, reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 71 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds.,
2005) (concluding that the Geneva Convetions did not apply to the conflict with the Taliban and
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The detainees were deliberately held in places where they were thought to
402
have no rights under the U.S. Constitution or any other domestic law. In
2003, the United States invaded Iraq, disrupting relationships with allies
and leading to a decline in support around the world for U.S. foreign
403
policy. Theories of American Empire became a hot topic of discussion in
404
the time leading up to, and following, the Iraq invasion. Meanwhile, the
Guantanamo detainees began to file habeas claims and the litigation wound
405
its way up to the Supreme Court. The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal
401
406
broke in May 2004, a month before the Court decided Rasu/, which was
the first enemy combatant case and appeared to herald a shift in the Court's
approach to special deference.
The Court may be finally adjusting to the reality of American power.
The U.S. has been a global hegemon since 1991 and has used military
means to enforce international law norms: for example, the U.S.-led
408
bombing of Serbia in 1998 halted ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. But the
scope and impact of America s projection of power since 9/11 has
underscored the significance of its unique status. The classic realist view of
the world with great powers ac.hieving a consensus that preserves a
409
precarious balance of power no longer fits.
Accordingly, the
institutional competences most valued for achieving governmental
effectiveness in foreign affairs in the classic realist world (with the
exception of speed) have become less important, and other competences
have become more important.
7

Al-Qaeda); Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, et al., Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS:
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005) (detennining
that all detainees held at Guantanamo are ,. unlawful enemy combatants").
402. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Def. 6-8 (Dec. 28, 2001) (regarding possible habeas jurisdiction over aliens held
in
Guantanamo
Bay,
Cuba),
available
at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/01.12.28.pdf.
403. See Holmes, supra note 369, at 68, 82-91.
404. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 339, at 25.
405. See MARGULIES, supra note 304, at 158.
406. /d.
407 See id.
408. See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1683, 1690 (2000) (arguing that "[m]ilitary action to aid the Kosovar Albanians was the
right thing to do''); Ruth S. Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
828, 828 (1999) (noting that NATO's action in Kosovo "may also mark the emergence of a
limited and conditional right of humanitarian intervention" in international law).
409. Craig, supra note 9, at 168.
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Nonetheless, since 9/11, deferentialists have argued that the classic
realist justifications for special deference apply with even more force to the
410
war on terror. This is the constitutional equivalent of a problem that has
hobbled U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century the persistence of
Cold War paradigms in strategic thinking. Administration officials, in the
early days after 9/11, tended to lump together terrorist groups such as al
Qaeda and rogue states such as Iraq into one common existential enemy to
411
occupy the position of the former Soviet Union. The threat posed ·b y al
Qaeda is different because it cannot hope to remove the U.S. from its
position as global hegemon only another great power could do that.
Instead, the terrorist threat presents a challenge of hegemonic management
that can only be met by the combined effort of all branches of the U.S.
government. In the enemy combatant .cases, the Court seems to have
recognized this shift and asserted its authority. But whether or not the
enemy combatant cases were decided with these sorts of broad geopolitical
concerns in mind, the changed hegemonic order justifies the jurisprudence.
The Bush Administration's detainee policy made clear that due to
America's power the content of enforceable international law applicable
to the detainees would largely depend on interpretation by the U.S.
government. Under the classic realist paradigm, international law is less
susceptible to judicial comprehension. because it cannot be taken at face
value; its actual, enforceable meaning depends on ever-shifting political
dynamics and complex relationships among great powers. But in a
hegemonic system, while enforceable international legal norms may still be
political, their content is heavily influenced by the politics of one nation412
the United States. As an institution of that same government, the courts
are well-positioned to understand and interpret international law that has
been incorporated into U.S. law. Because the courts have the capacity to
track international legal nortns, there was no longer a justification for
exceptional deference to the Administration's interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions as applied to the detainees.
Professors Posner and Sunstein have argued for exceptional deference on
the ground that, unless the executive is the voice of the nation in foreign
affairs, other nations will not know whom to hold accountable for foreign
413
policy decisions.
But the Guantanamo litigation demonstrated that
American hegemony has altered this classic assumption as well. The
410.
411 .
412..
413.
text.

See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 3, at 186.
See HOLMES, supra note 369, at 153.
See Craig, supra note 9, at 168.
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1199; supra notes 285-87 and accompanying
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transparent and accessible nature of the U.S. govenunent made it possible
for other nations to be informed about the detainee policy and, conceivably,
to have a role in changing it. The Kuwaiti government hired American
414
attorneys to represent their citizens held at Guantanamo. In the enemy
combatant litigation, the govenunent was forced to better articulate its
detainee policies, justify the detention of each detainee, and permit attorney
415
visits with the detainees. Other nations learned about the treatment of
416
their citizens through the information obtained by attomeys.
Although the political climate in the U.S. did not enable other nations to
have an effect on detainee policy directly and Congress, in fact, acted
417
twice to limit detainees' access to the courts
this was an exceptional
situation. Foreign governments routinely lobby Congress for favorable
foreign affairs legislation, and are more successful with less politically418
charged issues. Even "rogue states'·' such as Myanmar have their lobbyists
419
in Washington. In addition, foreign governments facing unfavorable court
420
decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through political channels.
The accessibility and openness of the U.S. government is not a scandal or
weakness; instead, it strengthens American hegemony by giving other
nations a voice in policy, drawing them into deeper relations.hips that serve
421
America's strategic interests. In the Guantanamo litigation, the courts
served as an important accountability mechanism when the political
branches were relatively unaccountable to the interests of other nations.
The hegemonic model also reduces the n.e ed for executive branch
flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts.
The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends on the
ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance depends on,
422
among other things, predictability.
G. John Ikenberry analogizes
America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation'' seeking
foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy making in a
democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and
414. Neil Macfarquhar, Kuwaitis Press U.S. Over 12 Held at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2002, at Al8.
415. WITTES, supra note 289, at 17.
416. Carol D. Leonnig, Further Detainee Abuse Alleged, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2004, at
Al.
417. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
418. See John T. Tierney, Interest Group Involvement in Foreign and Defense Policy, in
CONGRESS RESURGENT, supra note 352, at 95-97.
419. Michael Isikoff, A Convention Quandary, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 2008, at 5.
420. Spiro, supra note 12, at 649.
421. IKENBERRY, IMPERIAL, supra note 102, at 191.
422. G. John Ikenberry, American Unipolarity: The Sources of Persistence and Decline, in
AMERICA UNRIVALED: THE FUTURE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER, supra note 334, at293-94.
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accountability." Stable interpretation of the law bolsters the stability of
the system because other nations will know that they can rely on those
interpretations and that there will be at least some degree of enforcement by
the United States. At the same time, the separation of powers serves the
global-governance function by reducing the ability of the executive branch
24
to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. '~
The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and
faults, was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and
was therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated
quickly, by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without
consulting Congress and over the objections of even some within the
425
executive branch. Although the Administration invoked the law of armed
conflict to justify its detention of enemy combatants, it did not seem to
426
recognize limits imposed by that law. Most significantly, it designed the
detention scheme around interrogation rather than incapacitation and
excluded the detainees from all legal protections of the Geneva
427
Conventions.
It declared all detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy
combatants" without establishing a regularized process for making an
428
individual determination for each detainee. And when it established the
military commissions, also without consulting Congress, the Administration
429
denied defendants important procedural protections.
In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could
make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum flexibility
to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed, the
precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy
combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s a period when the
international system was radically unstable, and the United States was one
430
of several great powers vying for advantage. But during that time, the
executive branch faced much more exogenous pressure from other great
powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured
enemies. If the United States strayed too far from established norms, it
would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other consequences from
423. /d. at 294.
424. /d. at 292.
425. BENJAMIN WriTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
TERROR 8 (2008); MARGULIES, supra note 304 at 224-26.
426. MARGULIES, supra note 304, at 43 ("Throughout the war on terror, the Administration
has appropriated power from particular sources while rejecting the corresponding limits.").
427. See id. at 43.
428. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
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powerful rivals. Today, there are no such constraints: enemies such as al
Qaeda are not great powers and are not likely to obey international law
anyway. Instead, the danger is that American rule-breaking will set a pattern
431
of rule-breaking for the world, leading to instability. America)s military
predominance enables it to set the rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks
its own rules, it loses legitimacy.
The Supreme Court's response to the detainee policy enabled the U.S.
government as a whole to hew more closely to established procedures and
norms, and to regularize the process for departing from them. After
432
Hamdi, the Department of Defense established a process, the CSRTs, for
making an individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all
detainees at Guantanamo. After the Court recognized habeas jurisdiction at
433
Guantanamo, Congress passed the DTA,
establishing direct judicial
review of CSRT determinations in lieu of habeas. Similarly, after the Court
434
declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan, this forced the
Administration to seek congressional approval for commissions that
435
restored some of the rights afforded at courts martial. In Boumediene, the
Court rejected the executive branch's foreign policy arguments, and bucked
436
Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review.
Throughout this enemy combatant litigation, it has been the courts'
relative insulation from politics that has enabled them to take the long view.
In contrast, the President's (and Congress's) responsiveness to political
concerns in the wake of 9/11 has encouraged them to depart from
established norms for the nation's perceived short-term advantage, even at
437
the expense of the nation's long-term interests. As Derek Jinks and Neal
Katyal have observed, "[t]reaties are part of [a] system of time-tested
standards, and this feature makes the wisdom of their judicial interpretation
438
manifest. "
At the same time, the enemy combatant cases make allowances for the
executive branch's superior speed. The care that the Court took to limit the
issues it decided in each case gave the executive branch plenty of time to
431. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1245 (noting that other nations have justified
the abuse of prisoners because of U.S. practices).
432. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
433. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
435. See
Posting
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Jack
M.
Balkin
to
Balkinization,
http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html (June 29,
2006, 13:07 EST).
436. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
437. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 257, at 1264.
438. /d.
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439

arrive at an effective detainee policy. Hamdi, Rasul, and Boumediene
recognized that the availability of habeas would depend on the distance
440
from the battlefield and the length of detention.
The enemy combatant litigation also underscores the extent to which the
classic realist assumptions about courts' legitimacy in foreign affairs have
been turned on their head. In an anarchic world, legitimacy derives largely
from brute force. The courts have no armies at their disposal and look weak
441
when they issue decisions that cannot be enforced. But in a hegemonic
system, where governance depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts
have a greater role to play. Rather than hobbling the exercise of foreign
442
policy, the courts are a key form of "soft power." As Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion observed in Boumediene, courts can bestow external
443
legitimacy on the acts of the political branches. Acts having a basis in law
are almost universally regarded as more legitimate than merely political
acts. Most foreign policy experts believe that the Bush Administration's
444
detention scheme ''hurt America's image and standing in the world. " The
restoration of habeas corpus in Boumediene may help begin to counteract
this loss of prestige.
Finally, the enemy combatant cases are striking in that they embrace a
445
role for representation-reinforcement in the international realm. Although
defenders of special deference acknowledge that courts' strengths lie in
protecting the rights of minorities, it has been very difficult for courts to
protect these rights in the face of exigencies asserted by the executive
branch in foreign affairs matters. This is especially difficult when the
minorities are alleged enemy aliens being held outside the sovereign
territory of the United States in wartime. In the infamous Korematsu
decision, another World War II-era case, the Court bowed to the President's
factual assessment of the emergency justifying detention ofU.S. citizens of
446
Japanese ancestry living in the United States. In Boumediene, the Court
439. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the HWar on Terror,, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 1013, 1015 (2008) (arguing that the enemy combatant decisions were "mostly about
process").
440. See supra notes 105-106, 111-113, 128-129, and accompanying text.
441. See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 952.
442. Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1391 (2007).
443. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
444. See Guantanamo's Shadow, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, at 40, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200710/guantanamo-poll (polling a bipartisan group of leading
policy experts and finding 87% believed the U.S. detention system. had hurt the fight against al
Qaeda).
445. Katyal, supra note 442, at 1391.
446. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944); see also Gott, supra note
213, at 223.
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pointedly declined to defer to the executive branch's factual assessments of
447
military necessity. The court may have recognized that a more aggressive
role in protecting the rights of non-citizens was required by American
hegemony. In fact, the arguments for deference with respect to the rights of
non-citizens are even weaker because aliens lack a political constituency in
448
the United States.
This outward-looking fonn of representationreinforcement serves important functions. It strengthens the legitimacy of
U.S. hegemony by establishing equality as a benchmark and reinforces the
449
sense that our constitutional values reflect universal human rights.
CONCLUSION

When it comes to the constitutional regime of foreign affairs, geopolitics
has always mattered. Understandings about America's role in the world
have shaped foreign affairs doctrines. But the classic realist assumptions
that support special deference do not reflect the world as it is today. A
better, more realist, approach looks to the ways that the courts can reinforce
and legitimize America's leadership role. The Supreme Court's rejection of
the government's claimed exigencies in the enemy combatant cases strongly
indicates that the Judiciary is becoming reconciled to the current world
order and is asserting its prerogatives in response to the fewer constraints
imposed on the executive branch. In other words, the courts are moving
toward the hegemonic model. In the great dismal swamp that is the judicial
treatment of foreign affairs, this transformation offers hope for clarity: the
positive reality of the international system, despite terrorism and other
serious challenges, permits the courts to reduce the "deference gap"
between foreign and domestic cases.

447. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,, 2261 (2008).
448. Katyal, supra note 442, at 1387.
449. /d. at 1391 ("America's soft power depends, in no small part, on being able to rise
above pettiness and to highlight the vitality of our system.'').

